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Background and Terms of Reference 
 
FAO technical support to member countries in the areas of policy and planning has 
taken on a new dimension since the late 1980s.  The inclusion of agriculture in 
international trade negotiations (Uruguay Round) has made the sector increasingly 
sensitive to trade-related issues.  Simultaneously agriculture is increasingly linked 
with the other sectors of the economy and moving away from subsistence production 
to production for markets.  Trade liberalisation initiatives imply future demand and 
supply shifts and dynamic adjustments in markets that will have far-reaching and 
unpredictable effects on food trade.  The risks inherent in and uncertainties associated 
with trade-oriented supply stabilisation is a serious food security issue that must be 
addressed by appropriate policies. 
 
 Given population growth, pressure on agricultural land, increasing demands on 
limited water resources from urban sectors, intensified cropping, and widespread land 
degradation, sustainable agricultural resource management is critical to food security.  
Sustainability and environmental issues are increasing in importance, placing new 
pressures on policy formation.  In light of these trade-related changes, this report 
provides guidance to FAO professionals on the manner to contribute to policy design.  
In all countries, the objective of agricultural policy should be to foster the best use of 
agricultural resources, with the over-riding goal of improving food security.  
Agricultural policies themselves are always implemented within a macroeconomic 
framework.  Consistency between sectoral policies and macroeconomic policies is 
key to long term food security. 
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I.  The Purpose of this Report 
 
The purpose of this report is 
  1.   to provide FAO professionals with the basic analytical principles of economic 
policy making for agriculture; 
  2.  it does not seek to convert non-economists into economists, but rather to provide 
technical experts with a familiarity of the discourse of economic policy, so they 
can apply their technical skills more effectively;  and  
  3.  it particularly targets those involved in technical field work, whose specialised 
knowledge is repeatedly evaluated within an economic context of costs and 
benefits. 
 
 Over the last four decades, the consensus among economists and policy 
makers about the appropriate policy for agricultural development has changed 
considerably.  Until the mid-1970s the overwhelming majority view was that 
agricultural markets1 in both developed and developing countries had inherent 
characteristics which required a range of government interventions, to maintain price 
and income stability, and to protect producers, especially smallholders, against 
bankruptcy.  During the next twenty years this consensus disappeared, to be replaced 
by another, that agricultural markets were generally efficient, and that ‘policy 
failures’ resulting from interventions were more economically costly than ‘market 
failures’.  By the late 1990s, the latter consensus weakened, as part of the more 
general disenchantment with the so-called Washington consensus (see Stiglitz 1998), 
in favour of a more interventionist perspective.  The non-economist might find these 
shifts in consensus among economists puzzling, especially since they cannot be 
adequately explained by the accumulation of either empirical or theoretical 
knowledge. 
 
 There are no simple and unambiguous policy prescriptions for the agricultural 
sector which the economics profession can provide.  In place of this, the discipline 
offers various methodologies and analytical tools to guide policy makers, when they 
are faced with problems that require a response from the public sector.  The purpose 
of this ‘guide’ is to present the range of policy questions that FAO professionals will 
encounter in the field, and to do so in a rigorous, non-technical manner, so that one 
need not be an economists to appreciate the complexities of formulating economic 
policy.  To accomplish this task, the guide first explains the general, abstract 
framework (‘theory’) which is applied to concrete problems, from which policy 
generalisations are derived.  The presentation of this framework begins with what is 
called the normative2 non-intervention model, which is based upon the tenet that all 
markets operate efficiently.  In the non-intervention model, public sector interventions 
in markets create distortions and should be minimised.  Few economists who 
specialise in development issue would except the extreme form of this model;  many 
would not accept its general approach.  The reasons for the scepticism are discussed 
to explain the broad theoretical basis for public sector interventions in markets. 
 
                                                          
1 Many common-place words assume particular and specific definition in economic discourse, and 
‘market’ is one of these.  Such terms will be ‘flagged’ by use of italics when first used, indicating that 
their definition will be presented subsequently. 





A market is not a simple thing 
The word ‘ market’ is oft-used in economics, frequently with considerable ambiguity.  There are senses 
in which the term might be used.  The different meanings reflect several usages: a concrete usage, 
which treats markets as entities which are socially constructed; a theoretical usage that typically 
abstracts from the social context of markets;  and, a political usage, which endorses a particular form 
of organisation for society. 
1.  A ‘market’ can refer to a concrete place, where at specific times under formal and often strict 
rules, buying and selling occurs.  In this sense the London Stock Exchange or the collection of 
money changers in the Kano (Nigeria) old city are markets. 
2. A ‘market’ can refer to a more abstract and broader institution through which information is 
transmitted, in the form of ‘market signals’ . 
3. A ‘market’ may involve a complete abstraction from concrete trading places, which is 
personified with as representing a collective will.  Something of this sort is meant when one 
reads that ‘financial markets will not tolerate high fiscal deficits’. 
4. As a adjective, ‘ market’ can refer to a system of regulation, or even a form of organisation for 
society as a whole.  It is this sense in which one uses the term ‘ market forces’ and ‘ reliance on 
markets’, as opposed to social regulation through governments. 
The potential for confusion can be demonstrated by taking an example.  There is a political 
economy position which rejects direct government action for poverty reduction as ineffective, and 
proposes instead that poverty would be reduced by public action to make markets operate more 
efficiently.  Thus, ‘ a more appropriate role for the government would be to reduce 
information…costs’  (Gaiha 1993, p. 64).    
 
How does a government reduce information costs in markets?  To the extent that improving 
information flows refers to concrete markets (#1), the task is a relatively simple one of 
communications system, standardisation of weights and measures, improving market stalls, etc.  
But, improving the efficiency of markets means considerably than these concrete activities, for it 
refers to the efficiency of market signals (#2).   Among other things, facilitating efficient market 
signals requires enforcing competition, and ensuring that private costs cover social costs (e.g., 
pollution costs).  Market signals will serve their function of regulating the allocation of resources 
if producers are ruled by market forces (#3).  For this to be the case, there must be a free market in 
land (which in many sub-Saharan countries there is not), labour must be mobile (ethic and other 
social distinctions may limit this), and the market-facilitating institutional framework established 
and clear.  Particularly the latter is unlikely to be the case in low-income countries.   This 
discussion suggests that improving the efficiency of markets is, in effect, the process of 
development itself. 
 
 The agriculture sector has a number of important characteristics that, for 
purposes of prescribing economic policy, set it apart from other sectors of the 
economy.  No serious understanding of policy issues or policy debates is possible 
without first treating these characteristics.  These characteristics, familiar to FAO 
professionals, can be organised under the following headings:  1) agriculture involves 
a range of economic activities in addition to cultivation (grazing, forestry, and 
fishing);  2) the development of agriculture interacts in important and particular ways 
with the development of other sectors, and of the economy as a whole;  3) more than 
other economic sectors, agricultural production, commerce and income are governed 
by risk and uncertainty;  4) forms of use rights (tenure) to agricultural land and water 
are considerably more varied than in other sectors;  5) central to long-term 
agricultural development is sustainability, particularly environmental sustainability;  
and  6)  because of the foregoing characteristics, agricultural markets (especially land 
and labour markets) have unique institutional features. 
 With an understanding of the nature of economic argument and the relevant 
characteristics of agriculture, one can consider economic policies that affect the 
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sector.  Macroeconomic policies set the framework for stability in which agricultural 
producers operate, and are part of the determinant of the economy’s growth 
performance.   All governments tax, in order to provide for a range of public goods 
and other public sector activities.  A central issue in long term development, as well 
as short-term policy, is the extent to which agriculture can and should be taxed.  
Taxation of agriculture is one of many instruments by which governments implicitly 
or explicitly intervene in the operation of agricultural markets.  The various 
instruments of intervention are presented and discussed in detail.  Access to land (and 
to waters for fishing) is the basis of agricultural production.  In many developing 
countries, especially the sub-Saharan countries, rights of access are in a state of flux 
and cannot be taken as parameters when determining policy.  Indeed, land tenure, in 
the broadest sense, is a major preoccupation of governments and donor agencies 
(especially the World Bank).  This is a major area of agricultural policy that FAO 
professionals must consider in their work in the field. 
 
 After a discussion of analytical issues in Sections 2-4, the presentation turns to 
the new trading regulations set by the Agreement on Agriculture (AonA) of the 
Uruguay Round (UR), and implemented through the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO).  It is important to clarify the impact of the AonA, which in practice sets 
relatively few limits to policies which developing countries would be motivated to 
continue or initiate.  This limited impact is in part the result of exceptions and 
exemptions permitted, and, more importantly, due to the special status of the Least 
Developed Countries (LtDCs).3 
 
 This guide cannot provide definitive answers for many policy issues, but it can 
indicate areas of consensus and disagreement.  While economic policy has a 
technical-economic component, few aspects can be determined by this component 
alone.  Successful policy combines economic theory, the contributions of the other 
social sciences (including history), and scientific and technical expertise on 
agricultural production, and does so in a pragmatic matter.  Thus, this guide is meant 
not merely to inform, but also to facilitate the involvement of technical experts (e.g., 
agronomists and nutrition experts) to participate in policy determination.  The FAO 
has a constituency of member governments, which are ultimately responsible form 
formulating and implementing policy.  This guide does not dictate policy, but presents 
the issues such that FAO professionals can contribute to a dialogue with the 
governments they serve in a technical capacity.  To facilitate this, an extensive 
bibliography is provided, along with relevant footnotes supplying the more important 




                                                          
3 The initials LtDC will be used to avoid confusion with the more common acronym, LDC, which is 
used for ‘less developed countries’ (though ‘LDC’ will not be employed in this report, precisely to 
avoid confusion). 
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II. The analytical basis for economic policy towards agriculture 
 
 This section does the following: 
1.  it explains that an economic distortion is a concept based upon a 
specific theoretical framework; 
2.  it presents the theoretical basis for this concept; 
3.  using that theoretical framework, it explains the ambiguities inherent in 
the concept;  and 
4.  it explains that the WTO definition of distortion is practical and 
pragmatic, rather than theoretical;  and 
5. it concludes with a general statement of the external constraints on 
domestic agricultural policy. 
 
 Central in discussions of agricultural policy is the concept of economic 
distortion.  One finds the term used in virtually all policy documents, especially in the 
reports of the multilateral agencies.  One finds it used in the documents of the 
Uruguay Round and the WTO, which make reference to trade distorting measures or 
actions, almost always by governments.  To appreciate the implications of this 
concept, it is necessary to begin at first principles. Any entity, be it a person, a market, 
or an idea, can undergo a change without suffering form a distortion.  The word 
‘distortion’ implies a standard or normal condition, shape, or nature, such that 
derivation from that norm is judged to be distorted.  A mirror provides a useful 
example.  A mirror, which enlarges or reduces an image, but keeps all proportions the 
same changes the image but does not distort it.  A mirror which alters the proportions 
of an image (such as one finds in side-shows of carnivals that make people look fatter 
or thinner than life) is distortionary.  Similarly in economics, to talk of a market 
distortion (as opposed to a mere difference or change), one must specify the normal 
by which the distortionary effect is judged. 
 
 This norm is called Pareto Optimality.  The formal definition of Pareto 
Optimality is: 
 
 Pareto Optimality refers to an economic system as a whole (not to 
individual markets).  A system is Pareto Optimal, if no economic agent’s 
(person’s) welfare can increase without someone else’s welfare 
decreasing. 
In other words, any allocation of inputs and distribution of outputs except 
the prevailing one would leave at least one agent worse off. 
 
 With this definition of the norm for economic systems, one can provide an 
unambiguous definition of an economic distortion. 
 
 A distortion results when something blocks an economic system from 
achieving Pareto Optimality.  In this analytical framework economic 
distortions have two origins: 
  1. Private sector distortions ( also called ‘market failure’) 
  2. Public sector distortions (not to confused with ‘government failures’) 
 
 This definition of distortions derives from establishing the validity of the 
Pareto Optimality.  The necessary condition for Pareto Optimality is perfect 
competition.  An economic system is perfectly competitive if: 
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1. there are a large number of buyers and sellers of every product, none of 
whom can, by their individual actions, affect the market price;4 
2.  all producers operate on short run variable cost curves which are U-shaped, 
implying a unique level of output at which average total cost is a minimum;5 
3.  all producers face long run average cost curves which are also U-shaped. 
Implying for each firm a unique level of output in the long run at which 
average total cost is minimised;6  
4. all producers and consumers possess (or can obtain with minimal cost) full 
information about market conditions;7  
5.  there are no costs or benefits of production or consumption which are not 
captured in market prices (i.e., no external economies or diseconomies in 
production or consumption);  and 
6. there exists a mechanism to bring the system as a whole from 
disequilibrium to general equilibrium.8 
 
 These assumptions allow for a full employment general equilibrium in the 
economic system, in which social cost and social benefit are equal to private cost and 
private benefit, and, at the margin, equal to each other (achieved through the 
adjustment of relative prices).  Full employment of all available resources is a 
necessary condition for a Pareto Optimum.  Were some resources idle, this would 
violate the definition that the optimum ensures that no one’s welfare could be 
increased without someone else’s being reduced.  In the optimal state, all producers 
and consumers are constrained in their decisions only by relative prices and their 
resource endowments.  In other words, consumption is not constrained by income,9 
and production is not constrained by expectations of demand.10 
 
 There is a further, technical condition for the Pareto Optimality to conform to 
its definition (no one can be made better off without someone else becoming worse 
                                                          
4 Since producers are small, they can sell their entire output at the prevailing market price.  An attempt 
by one producer to sell at a higher price will result in the loss of the firm’s entire market share.  It is in 
no producer’s interest to sell below the prevailing price.  In this circumstance, producers are described 
as ‘ price-takers’.  This assumption is dependent upon numbers 2 and 3, below. 
5 This assumption allows for a short-run competitive solution.  If there were no least cost point 
consistent with many producers, the result would be that a few firms would expand as costs fall, and 
come to dominate the market. 
6 This assumption allows for a long-run competitive equilibrium.  If when plant size increased, unit 
costs fell over the relevant range of output demanded, in the long run,  a few producers would expand 
and eliminate the others. 
7 This assumption eliminates the possibility of what is called ‘false trading’:  exchanges at non-
equilibrium prices.  If such trades occur (when demand and supply are not equal), the market may not 
achieve the Pareto Optimal price set (see Weeks 1994).  The old version of this assumption is called 
‘perfect expectations’, and the more recent version ‘rational expectations’.  Theoretically they are 
equivalent (see Weeks 1989, chap. 9). 
8 This is an extremely strong assumption.  The modern explanation of how general equilibrium is 
achieved was by Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1959).  Commenting on this, Hahn (a leading 
neoclassical theorist) wrote:  ‘The main conclusion [about general equilibrium market clearing] is 
rather pessimistic:  we have no good reason to suppose that there are forces which lead the economy to 
equilibrium.  By that I mean we have no good theory’ (Hahn 1984, p. 13). 
9 Given an agent’s resource endowments, the decision on how much income to earn is made 
simultaneously with the decision on consumption.  The income decision is the assessment of the trade-
off between work and leisure, in light of relative prices. 
10 If producers are ‘price-takers’, they assume that they can sell an infinite amount at the prevailing 
price, which the level of output determined by the equation of marginal revenue (price, for a price-
taker) and margin cost. 
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off): the full employment general equilibrium set of market prices must be unique.  
That is, there should be one and only one set of full employment, general equilibrium 
prices.  The reason for this restriction should be obvious.  Were there more than one 
full employment general equilibrium set of prices, in general, it would be the case that 
some agents would be better off with one set of prices than with another, but all sets 
would be equivalent when judged by economic criteria.  The conditions are quite 
restrictive under which the full employment general equilibrium set of prices is 
unique. 
 
 The foregoing theoretical presentation produces the following strong policy 
position. 
 IF AND ONLY IF 
1. an economic system is perfectly competitive (assumptions 1-5); 
2. the perfectly competitive system produces a full employment general 
equilibrium set of prices (assumption 6);  and 
3. this set of prices is unique; 
THEN 
4. social welfare is maximised; 
5. any action, institution, or policy which prevents achievement of the full 
employment general equilibrium price set reduces social welfare, and can 
be described as distortion, in that it distorts the economic system from 
achieving its maximum social efficiency. 
 
 Distortions, or market failures,11 can arise from private, as well as public 
actions.  Imperfect competition in one sector, monopoly in the extreme case, distorts 
not only the market in which competition is imperfect, but the entire economic 
system.  Consider a closed economy with two products, fertiliser and maize.12  
Assume that fertiliser is produced in ten identical plants, each with different owners, 
and the market is perfectly competitive.  For maize, there are a large number of 
labour-hiring farmers, and this market, too, is perfectly competitive.  If there were an 
ownership change, such that one firm owned all ten fertiliser plants, the market for 
fertiliser would be monopolised.  The price of fertiliser would rise, and output and 
resource use in the sector would fall, creating unemployed labour.  If labour markets 
were competitive, real wages would fall, lowering the marginal (and average) costs in 
both sectors.  This would increase employment in both fertiliser and maize.13  The 
new equilibrium would have the following characteristics: 
 
                                                          
11 It is tempting, but theoretically unsound, to use the term ‘government failure’ as the public sector 
equivalent of a ‘ market failure’.  For example, Makandya writes: 
Policy failure…is defined as a government intervention that distorts a well-functioning market, 
exacerbates an existing failure, or fails to establish the foundations for the market to function 
efficiently. (Makandya 1994, p. 215) 
This definition is consistent only if one abandons a Pareto approach to efficiency (which Makandya 
does in definition of ‘market failure’).  A market failure in the strict theoretical sense refers to a failure 
to achieve the Pareto Optimal solution.  Thus, it has a clear and theoretically based definition.  Since a 
may be impossible for a government intervention to achieve Pareto Optimality, its success or failure 
has no clear theoretical criteria to assess it.  It would be less confusing and more accurate to refer to 
‘market failures’ and ‘government mistakes’, with latter judged pragmatically. 
12 A closed economy is assumed to keep the example simple.  The same argument could be extend to 
the case in which both products were traded, one imported, the other exported. 
13 For fertiliser, employment would be less than under perfect competition, but more than under 
monopoly before real wages fell. 
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1. the price of fertiliser would be higher than under perfect competition (the 
Pareto Optimum), and output lower; 
2. the price of maize would be lower, and output higher;  and 
3. real wages would be lower in both sectors, and profits higher in the fertiliser 
sector. 
 
 To correct this distorted equilibrium the government could impose a price 
ceiling on fertiliser, setting it at what would prevail under perfect competition.  This 
represents an intervention that corrects a market distortion.  Removal of the price 
ceiling, perhaps motivated by a policy to ‘liberalise’ the fertiliser market, would 
reduce social welfare. This example provides a general conclusion. 
 
 A private sector distortion, such as monopoly, reduces welfare;  removing 
government interventions that in part or whole correct this distortion also 
reduces social welfare. 
 
 Actual economies suffer form many private sector distortions, especially in 
agriculture.  Thus, in actual economies one finds a complex and interactive collection 
of private distortions, government interventions which in part correct those 
distortions, government interventions that target distortions but fail to correct them, 
and government interventions not obviously related to any private distortion, real or 
imagined.  From a Pareto Optimum framework, eliminating government interventions 
that correct private distortions is welfare-reducing;  eliminating government 
interventions that do not correct market distortions may be welfare-raising.  The 
qualified verb, ‘may be’, is necessary because of the Principle of the Second Best.  
This principle, derivative form the Pareto Optimum, states that if there are many 
distortions in an economy, removing some, but not all, will not necessarily raise social 
welfare.14 
 
 This excursion into the theory of welfare economics demonstrates the highly 
theoretical nature of the concept, economic distortion.  The seriousness with which 
economists have viewed the Pareto framework has waxed and waned.  If either 
because of theoretical objections or practical considerations, one believes that there is 
no Pareto Optimum, then the term ‘distortion’ assumes an ambiguous meaning.  For 
example, there is no doubt that tariffs ‘distort’ the level and composition of imports, 
compared to what would be the outcome without the tariffs.  But if private importers 
have market power, then trade would be ‘distorted’ in the absence of tariffs.  It might 
be argued in this case that whether or not one accepts the Pareto framework, and 
regardless of private monopoly power, removing (or lowering) tariffs would reduce 
the price of imported commodities, and consumers would thereby gain.  However, 
this is not a valid inference to draw.  In the absence of a norm, there is no objective 
basis for judging that a lower price for one or many commodities is welfare-
increasing.  For example, cheaper fertiliser imports will benefit some (e.g., farmers), 
but harm others (e.g., domestic producers of fertiliser).  It is the Pareto framework, in 
                                                          
14 More formally, the principle says that in the absence of being able to attain all the conditions 
necessary for a Pareto Optimum, the (‘best outcome’), the second-best position is not one in which the 
remaining conditions conform to Pareto rules.  In our example of fertiliser and maize, if maize output 
remained at its Pareto level, there would unemployed resources.  This might (or might not) be worst 
than a distorted level of maize output, lower real wages, and full employment.  The principle of the 
second best was developed by R. G. Lipsey and K. Lancaster  in the 1956. 
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its strong version with a unique social optimum, that allows judgements about such 
trade-offs between interest groups. 
 
 The theoretical discussion produces the following conclusions, which are 
generally accepted as valid. 
 
 A policy intervention in a market by a government can be consider to 
distort that market (as opposed to merely affecting a change), if 
1. one first establishes a unique market outcome which is characterised by 
full employment and a socially optimal allocation of resources (Pareto 
Optimality); 
If 
2. the restrictive assumptions upon which the Optimum outcome is based 
are not accepted as theoretically valid, or judge to be empirically refuted, 
then the concept of distortion becomes ambiguous. 
 
 This conclusion does not imply that the concept of distortion is invalid, but 
rather that it requires an operational definition that is not dependent upon the very 
restrictive Pareto framework.15  As will be shown below, in the Uruguay Round 
agreements, the term ‘trade distorting’ is used.  This is defined (and applied in the 
AonA) as a government policy which either reduces trade, or acts directly on specific 
commodities to increase the competitiveness of domestic producers.  Emphasis in the 
UR agreements is placed on measures judged to reduce trade, because important 
interventions that are judged to increase trade are not restricted by the UR.  For 
example, the agreements are largely neutral with regard to consumer subsidies, while 
prescribing producer subsidies.  In a Pareto framework the two types of subsidies 
would be judged equally distorting and detrimental to social welfare.  
 
 The UR agreements accept consumer subsidies because they are judged to 
potentially increase trade, by increasing consumption above what would be case in the 
absence of the subsidy (i.e., they are Pareto distorting).  Thus, the UR framework uses 
a practical and pragmatic definition of distortion, based on the goal of increasing 
world trade.  This goal may or may not increase social welfare, economic growth, and 
productive efficiency;  these are controversial questions, to which economics provides 
no consensual judgement.  In effect, those governments that chose to join the WTO 
explicitly endorse the essentially political goal of increasing world trade, and, thus, 
accept the implied definition of ‘trade distorting’. 
 
 There can be not theoretical objection to the WTO definition of distortion, 
since it is not a definition based upon welfare theory.  The term ‘distortion’ is also 
used in the context of structural adjustment programmes;  in this case, the definition is 
clearly drawn from the Pareto framework.  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
structural adjustment programmes use ‘distortion’ to cover a much broader range of 
government interventions.  For example, consumer subsidies, about which the WTO 
                                                          
15 In a report for the FAO, Smith and Thomson concluded: 
…[T]he Pareto-efficiency model cannot be used as a standard for comparison [in policy 
decisions]… This in turn means that efficiency can no longer be assessed in terms of pricing, or 
marginal social cost equalling marginal social benefit.  Second, if this rather abstract 
framework can no longer be used…much more emphasis must be placed on the particular 
institutional context in which the question of liberalization is being examined’(Smith & 
Thomson 1991, pp. 108-109). 
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is neutral, are viewed negatively in adjustment programmes, as much for their 
‘consumption distorting’ effect as for their budgetary implications.  As shown above, 
the theoretical basis for this broad definition of distortion is weak. 
 
 Overall, the discussion of this section provides the following conclusions. 
 
 When formulating agricultural policy, governments of developing 
countries are potentially constrained by two external influences: 
1. if the political decision is made to join the WTO, a range of policies 
defined by the WTO as trade reducing (‘distorting’) are prohibited, 
constrained, or required to be reduced over time;  and 
2. if the political decision is made to seek loans that are policy-conditional, 
most if not all government interventions in markets will be critically 





III. Characteristics of agriculture relevant to economic policy 
 1.  Agriculture is not only crops 
 
 Much discussion of agricultural policy tends to focus upon crops, with only 
occasional reference to fishing,16 forestry, and livestock, or these are treated as 
separate problems only marginally related to agriculture.  With the growing emphasis 
on environmentally sustainable development, this crop-dominated approach has 
changed.  It is important analytically to be explicit about the links among the four.  
Policies which might positively affect one could, as a result of that positive effect, had 
a negative impact on another.  The potential, and often realised, conflict between the 
expansion of commercial grazing and sound management of forestry resources is an 
obvious example.  Logging which is a prelude to conversion of forests to grazing 
creates irreversible environmental changes.  These changes may imply long-run costs 
to society that do not enter into the profit-loss calculations of private agents. 
 
  Simultaneous consideration of the four aspects of agriculture is central to the 
rational, long-run management of water resources.  The difficulty arise in identifying 
a set of policy instruments that produce the incentives for maintaining water tables, 
minimising water pollution, and sustaining the long-term climate balance.  A major 
practical problem is that most of the economists that write on agriculture know little 
beyond the crop sector.  The general conclusions reached, about efficiency of 
markets, are all too often implicitly based on the model of an annual (not even a 
perennial) production cycle.  This is particularly the case in discussions of price 
incentives, whose effect on behaviour is to induce producers to switch from less 
profitable to more profitable commodities.  For a choice between maize and millet, 
this may be a relatively simple calculation (though less simple than it seems, see 
Section 3.4).  If the alternatives include crops, grazing, and forestry products, the 
calculation is considerably more complicated, even if the technical aspects of 
production in each field are known to the chooser.  Further, the currently prevailing 
                                                          
16 This report does not explicitly treat policies for the fisheries sector, because of the rather technical 
issues involved.  A good survey is found in FAO 1998b, Chapter IV. 
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prices will not provide sufficient information for calculations of relative returns when 
some alternatives involve reproduction times in decades. 
 
 Thus, much of what is written about economic policy for agriculture should be 
viewed as ‘partial equilibrium’ analysis, in that it considers costs and benefits over a 
relatively short time period.  For example, devaluation, by fostering exports, may 
have a positive effect on the crop sector in both the short and long run;  it may have a 
positive effect on the livestock sector in the short run, but a negative effect in the long 
run (by encouraging over-grazing);  it may have a neutral effect on forestry in the 
short run (if the infrastructure for exploitation is lacking), and a negative effect in the 
long run (due to over-exploitation);  and a negative effect on fishing in the short run 
(over-exploitation), which proves disastrous in the long run.  None of these negative 
effects are necessary, but they are made more likely by a narrow view of agriculture 
as a sector dominated by an annual production cycle. 
 
 Even for the crop sector there are important characteristics that make 
agriculture different from other sectors with regard to producer response to markets.  
Smith has identified three of the most important: 
 
1. spatial dispersion, implying high transport costs and high cost of acquiring 
information on markets; 
2. land immobility and climatic variations that make production conditions 
vary seasonally, and implies the need for non-farm income for most small 
holders;  and 
3.  production is inherently risky, and more so than non-agricultural activities. 
 The discussion of policies should be read with these characteristics in mind, 
for they directly impact upon producer responses to markets.  
 
 
 2.  Agriculture and development 
 
 It is obvious that agriculture plays a key role in development.  It serves as a 
source of income for a substantial portion of the population in developing countries; 
as a supplier of food, raw materials, and foreign exchange to a country as a whole; 
and as the source of labour supply for expanding industry.  In addition, many authors, 
particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, stressed agriculture as a source of saving that 
could be transferred to non-agricultural sectors to foster their growth and, thus, 
industrialisation.  Empirical evidence indicates a ‘clear and positive relation between 
agricultural and non-agricultural growth’ for the 1960s and 1970s, but the relationship 
breaks down for the 1980s (Stern 1996, p. 73).  Why this empirical shift occurred is a 
source of some controversy, and requires a brief excursion to analyse the growth 
process in developing countries. 
 The process of economic development involves in the long run a fundamental 
structural change, in which agriculture declines in relative, then absolute importance.  
This decline has in all developed countries been associated with a dramatic increase in 
productivity in the sector, whether measured per worker or per unit of land.  This 
combination suggests that in the long run there is a complementary relationship 
between the growth of industry and the growth of agriculture.  The objective of long-
term agricultural policy is to maximise this complementarity.  There has been a 
tendency to forget this basic, historical relationship in the last two decades.  
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Especially in critiques of import substitution policies in Latin America, there has been 
an implicit, if not explicit, suggestion that industry expands at the cost of agriculture.  
In a perverse way, this became a self-fulfilling diagnosis.  During the 1980s, when 
most economies in Latin America and Africa suffered from low growth, industrial 
sectors declined, constrained by low domestic demand and, in some case, trade 
liberalisation which undermined domestic manufacturing.  In this context, agriculture 
not uncommonly grew faster than manufacturing,17 because the rate of growth of the 
latter fell to near zero. 
 
 Whether development policy should stress agricultural growth or structural 
change towards industry is an issue much debated in the growth literature.  In part the 
disagreement is over whether it is necessary for developing countries to pass through 
a period when economic policy purposefully shifts the terms of trade against 
agriculture, in order to foster industry.  A strong case against this was put forward in a 
multi-volume empirical study, funded by the World Bank of agricultural taxation in a 
selected group of developing countries (Schiff and Valdés 1992).  On the other hand, 
there remains a strong strand in the theoretical literature in support of taxing 
agriculture to accelerate growth (Sah and Stiglitz 1984, 1987).18  This issue is treated 
below, under agricultural taxation. 
 
 
3.  Resource Use:  Mobility and Flexibility 
 
 Market deregulation, and trade liberalisation in general, have the intention of 
enhancing the ability of producers and consumers to adjust to changes in the market 
conditions.  The argument is that when market conditions change, these changes are 
communicated to economic agents through changes in relative prices.  Consumers and 
producers then respond by altering their behaviour to minimise the loss or maximise 
the gain from the altered prices.  In the case of consumers, this involves substituting 
relatively cheaper commodities for more expensive ones;  for producers, it involves 
shifting from the production of less profitable commodities to more profitable ones.  
The extent to which losses can be minimised or gains maximised depends on the 
actual degree of substitution in consumption and production. 
 
 This abstract argument requires elaboration in the concrete for it to be relevant 
to policy, especially when considering agricultural production.  The flexibility in 
production, upon which deregulation policy is based, is epitomised by the corporate 
form of property ownership in non-agricultural sectors.  In this case, there is a high 
                                                          
17 In the 1970s across all Latin American Caribbean countries, the agricultural sector grew at 3.4 
percent per annum, and the manufacturing sector at 5.8 percent.  In the 1980s both rates fell, agriculture 
to 2.1 percent per annum, and manufacturing to .4 percent.  Through the first half of the 1990s both 
have grown at about two percent (IDB 1994, Table B-3; 1998, Table B-3). 
18 One of the most influential models is that of Sah and Stiglitz (who later became chief economist of 
the World Bank).  Their model implies that shifting resources from agriculture to non-agriculture is 
necessary for structural transformation.  Sarris points out the obvious implication of the model: 
In other words, [Sah-Stiglitz imply that] the overall direction of the policies that have been 
followed by many developing countries in the past has been correct.  This...would imply that 
the crises that have afflicted most of the developing countries in the last [p. 10] fifteen years 
must be attributed to factors other than the fundamental underlying principle of turning the 
terms of trade against agriculture… This…raises the issue whether the recommendation of all 
structural adjustment programs that explicit and implicit taxation of agriculture should be 
lessened is correct. (Sarris 1994, p. 11) 
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degree of separation between the ownership and financial function of the enterprise, 
on the one hand, and the production role, on the other.  When relative prices change, 
the ownership unit can shed its production unit and replace it with another.  The 
expertise required to produce the new, more profitable product can be purchased on 
the market;  indeed, an entire plant, with the appropriate employees can be purchased.  
This, the mobility of capital in the concrete, has historically been easier in the non-
agricultural sector, due to the particular property relations associated with occupation 
of land. 
 
 The conditions in developing countries, where a majority of agricultural 
producers are owner-occupiers and whose resource holdings are relatively small, are 
different.  Each crop or variety of livestock has its special characteristics.  Even 
superficially similar crops or animals, such as maize and sorghum, require different 
cultivation times, suffer from different diseases, and perform best with different mixes 
of chemical or organic fertilisers.  To successfully shift from one crop to another (e.g., 
in response to relative price changes), the owner-occupier must have the technical 
knowledge of the crop’s characteristics.  Smallholders will not, in general, have the 
financial resources to hire-in expertise;  indeed, given their scale of production, it 
might not be rational to do so.  In the developed countries, this problem was solved 
through publicly-funded agricultural extension services, whose activities facilitated a 
quite extraordinary degree of flexibility in production even for small-scale 
agriculturalists.  The flexibility was further facilitated because this technical 
assistance was supplemented with a range of services that reduced the risk of shifting 
to different varieties:  research on and dissemination of remedies for plant and animal 
diseases, price stabilisation measures, and sometimes crop insurance.  These 
agricultural services were delivered in a broader supportive context (e.g., technically 
sophisticated weather forecasting and social safety-nets). 
 
 The situation in developing countries is quite different.  First, a substantial 
proportion of the small holder’s produce may not be marketed.  This can be the result 
of a conscious, risk minimising strategy of emphasising feeding the family first, high 
transport costs, low competitiveness, or a combination of these.  Thus, in many 
developing countries, successful outcomes of deregulation require that small holders 
be induced from non-marketed to marketed production.  This shift can involve 
substantial risks, if, for example, it is associated with borrowing to purchase inputs. 
 
 Second, agricultural extension does not play the facilitating role in developing 
countries that it does in developed ones.  Extension services are typically narrow in 
their coverage (especially to small holders), of variable quality, and limited in the 
range of varieties for which they have technical expertise.  Thus, the ability of the 
small holder in developing countries to shift between crops is severely limited 
compared to the situation in developed countries.  No recourse to ‘peasant resistance 
to change’, or even ‘risk aversion’ is required to expect that resource flexibility in 
developing countries is likely to vary from moderate to quite low.  Poor transport, 
storage, and marketing facilities create further constraints on flexibility in resource 
use;  the shift to a more profitable commercial variety is successful only if the 
produce reaches markets in a timely manner. 
 
 The constraints to resource flexibility do not imply that deregulation would 
have no impact, or that its impact would be negative.  Rather, they imply that unlike 
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in developed countries, or unlike with large scale producers in developing countries, 
the small holder in developing countries may require a change in the broader context 
to take advantage of the potential gains from market flexibility.  It is the required 
changes in information services, marketing, etc., that lead to the strong conclusion 
that market liberalisation by itself is unlikely to generate substantial gains for small 
holders in developing countries.19  Thus, one can identify an important policy 
generalisation. 
 
 For developing countries, market deregulation policies require: 
1. an evaluation which disaggregates with respect to categories of 
agriculturalists (especially with regard to scale of operation);  and 
2. consideration of  non-price constraints, such as access to information, 
prior to policy implementation. 
 
These issues are ones in which the FAO has unique expertise. 
 
 
4.  Land tenure and rights of access 
 
 In the area of land rights, debate has tended to focus on land redistribution, but 
the policy issues and options are much broader than this.  Access to land and the 
associated concept of ‘property rights’ are extremely complex, and it is dangerous to 
make generalisations, due to the great variety of institutional arrangements that link 
people to land.  During the 1960s and 1970s, broad generalisations tended to be 
applied to the major regions of the underdeveloped world.  Latin America was 
characterised as being afflicted with an extremely unequal distribution of land, such 
that the vast majority of agriculturalists were either landless or land-poor, though land 
might not have been scarce in an absolute sense.20  In this region, land distribution 
was required to reduce rural poverty and provide food security.  Asia, on the other 
hand, was viewed as ‘overpopulated’, with heavy pressure on the land, with Java the 
extreme example.  In this case, land redistribution would reduce the problem,21 but a 
fundamental change in production techniques was required (e.g., the ‘green 
revolution’).  The expert consensus on most of Africa south of the Sahara was that the 
countries were land-abundant, with shortages of labour during critical periods.  
Institutional constraints (e.g., concentration of ownership of land) were not viewed as 
decisive.22 
                                                          
19 ‘…[M]uch more emphasis must be placed on the particular institutional context in which the 
question of liberalization is being examined’ (Smith & Thomson 1991, p. 110). 
20 This view was epitomised by White, who wrote that in El Salvador, land was scarce only for the poor 
(White 1973, p. 123). 
21 Many Asian countries introduced land redistribution, in several cases as the result of armed conflicts. 
22Platteau summarises the prevailing view in the 1950s and 1960s as follows: 
[O]nly Asia and Latin America were the focus of attention of land reformers… [T]hese two 
continents were considered to be in need of radical transformations of their agrarian structures 
on the grounds of both equity and deficiency considerations…[I]n Asia land reform simply 
meant “the transfer of ownership from the landowner to the cultivator of the existing 
smallholding,’ in Latin America the cure consisted of redistributing the land from latifundian 
owners to landless workers and small-scale cultivators…  In both regions, such reshuffling of 
land rights was to have no adverse effects on production… 
Only a few [African] countries – such as Egypt…Ethiopia…, and South Africa and 
Zimbabwe… were deemed to deserve a significant transformation of their agrarian structure.  
For the rest, Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, was regarded as a “special case”…on 
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 Now, at the end of the century, these generalisations require major revision.  
While land ownership remains highly concentrated in Latin America, the perceived 
lack of success of several land reforms (e.g., Perú and Bolivia) reduced enthusiasm 
for the policy.  Further, urban migration and the modernisation of agriculture have 
fundamentally transformed the countryside.  For the region as a whole, less than 
twenty-five percent of the labour force will be in agriculture in 2000.  A substantial 
portion of this remaining labour force is in temporary of permanent wage 
employment, with own-farm activities accounting for a small share income earned.  
As a result, in several countries land redistribution is considerably less relevant to 
food security that in the past.23  In Asia, the combination of land redistribution, a 
spectacularly successful development of new varieties (especially rice), and rapid 
economic growth has moved the redistribution issue out of the centre of the policy 
debate.24  Perhaps the greatest conceptual change has been for the sub-Saharan 
countries.  As a result of rural population growth and the land-extensive cultivation 
practices, land in most countries can no longer be considered abundant.  As developed 
in more detail below, expanding cultivation in the sub-Saharan has brought into doubt 
the long-term (and perhaps medium-term) viability of prevailing land-extensive 
cultivation practices. 
 
 We use the term ‘and access’ to refer to the institutional arrangements by 
which people acquire the right to cultivate land.  The rules of land access have two 
broad policy impacts.  First, there is the direct effect, in which land access provides 
the asset by which people generate their livelihoods.  Second, rules of land access are 
perhaps the single most important determinant of the impact of government policies 
and market forces on the agricultural sector.  For example, price policies, which are 
stressed in the economic literature, will have different consequences depending upon 
the stability, predictability and enforceability of rules of access to land.  When rules of 
access are clear and enforceable in law, government policies and market incentives 
can be expected to have predictable outcomes, though the degree of response by 
agriculturalists will vary according to concrete conditions.  In many countries in 
which FAO professionals work, these rules will be clear, and rights of access can be 
treated as parameters within which policy can be implemented.  It may be that 
distribution is grossly unequal, but given the inequality, rules of access will be stable 
(indeed, that stability may be cause of severe social ills). 
 
 While in general FAO field staff will find that rules of access to land are not 
pressing policy issues in the countries in which they work, there are two important 
exceptions:  conflict affect countries and the sub-Saharan region.  It is unfortunately 
the case that many of FAO’s member states have been afflicted with armed conflicts 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  The majority of these are in Africa, but the problem is not 
limited to that continent.  Armed conflicts not infrequently arise over claims to land.  
As a result, the conflict can through ownership rights into question.  An extreme 
example of this is Nicaragua, where after the end of the so-called contra war, much of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
account of its abundant land endowments and the flexibility of its communal land tenure 
institutions. (Platteau 1992, pp. 4-5) 
23 This is obviously the case for Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, which have quite small 
agricultural labour forces. 
24‘…[S]ignificant progress in agricultural technologies not only helped to redirect attention toward the 
growth potential of the agricultural sector, but it also caused a shift of emphasis from policies mainly 
motivated by equity considerations…to policies motivated by efficiency considerations and concerned 
with technological innovations and their broad diffusion.’ (Ibid.) 
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the country’s agricultural land was contested by three different sets of claimants:  the 
pre-revolution owners (i.e., pre-1979), those who had received land titles under the 
Sandinista agrarian reform, and new claimants who through extra-legal occupation of 
land challenged the legitimacy of both the fore-mentioned.  There are cases in which 
conflict is not directly over land and the conflict itself is not associated with land 
redistribution, yet the disruption of war results in multiple land claims.  This can be 
the consequence of families or communities migrating to escape conflict, and 
returning to discover that other families or groups have established de facto control 
over what was formerly their land.  Relatively little research has been done on this 
problem, though it represents a major problem in some countries (especially, the 
Balkans, Central Africa).  In post-conflict situations rules of access to land are not, in 
general, clear, predictable, and enforceable.   
 
 While this uncertainty is a problem, it also presents an opportunity, especially 
in Africa where conflicts are many, to redesign rules of access consistent with the 
demographic and economic trends which have been emerging over the last decade.  
For example, after the end of the armed conflict in Mozambique, the government 
introduced a new land law which sought to clarify the different tenure regimes;  in 
particularly, it sought to clarify the status of so-called traditional rights to land. 
 
 Outside of the sub-Saharan region, the clarification of post-conflict land rights 
typically involves identifying owners within an established property regime.;  or, in 
the case of the former Socialist countries (conflict-affected or not), it has consisted of 
applying a relatively established regime of private property taken from Western 
European examples.25  The situation in the sub-Saharan region is quite different, and 
awareness of the policy issues involved is important to FAO work.  In most sub-
Saharan countries, private land rights in the Western European tradition are not 
legally recognised.26  Table 1 provides a very general summary of land tenure systems 
in the sub-Sahara for twenty-six countries.  In order to avoid an excessively detailed 
discussion, the presentation will limit itself to issues relevant to the debate over 
appropriate rules of access to facilitate agricultural development and food security.  
The discussion will also limit itself to cultivation and settled grazing.27 
 
                                                          
25 While all European private property rules are based on the principle of exclusivity (the owner has 
sole right of usage), they are not the same.  To take two extreme examples, in France exclusivity 
includes the prohibition of trespass;  in contrast, Swedish land rules grant exclusive productive use to 
the owner, but there is no offence, civil or criminal, of trespass. 
26 Platteau has an excellent survey of tenure systems in the sub-Saharan region.  Our presentation 
adheres to his general conclusion that ‘Sub-Saharan Africa is a special case [of rules of access] 
precisely because traditional land tenure systems…do not allow private land rights to be fully 
recognised still predominate…’ (Platteau 1992, p. 83). 
27 Thus, we exclude the following issues:  1) fishing rights, 2) access to forest resources, and 3) 
nomadic peoples.  Each of these involves important policy issues.  However, it is beyond the scope of 
this report to treat the specific access issues associated with each of these. 
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Table 1: 
Summary of Land Access Rules in the sub-Sahara, 1980s & 1990s 
Land Policy Countries 
Allow individual 
acquisition of land 
Cote d’Ivoire (no restrictions on power of title-holder), 
Kenya, Malawi (with restrictions) 
Various types of 
tenure recognised 
Chad, Madagascar, Mali and the Sudan (individual title and 
nationalisation of non-titled lands); Botswana, Ghana, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Swaziland, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe (individual title, indigenous systems 
and public lands); Senegal, Cameroon and Togo (individual, 
group, indigenous systems and public lands) 
Title vested in the 
state 
Ethiopia, Mauritania, Nigeria, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Zaire and Zambia 
Source:  Platteau, 1992, pp. 138-139 
 
 If a farm household has security of tenure, it is more likely to innovate, invest, 
and improve the land it cultivates or uses for grazing.  Within this non-controversial 
generalisation lurks a highly contentious debate over appropriate property regimes, 
with the controversy focussed on the sub-Saharan region.  The issue of debate is, 
which property regime provides security of tenure, and is this the same for all social 
and institutional situations?  A quite fervently held position is that sub-Saharan 
agriculture has performed poorly over an extended period in great part as a 
consequence of its communal property regimes.  The obvious solution to the problem 
is the privatisation of land throughout the region (see Feder & Noronha 1987).  
Sharply opposed to this is the view that privatisation of land in the region would result 
in social and economic disaster. 
 
 To appreciate the policy debate, one must clarify the term ‘ security’ in this 
context.  There are three aspects of security with regard to land which are relevant to 
property regimes:  1) enforceability of title, 2) extent of alienability, and 3) 
permanence of tenure.  If an agricultural household possesses an enforceable title to 
land, then it has secure access to land for the life and terms of that title.  It may be the 
case that the title bestows a limited alienability.  Alienability, in turn, potentially 
undermines permanence of tenure.  The extreme libertarian property regime proposed 
by some involves a legally enforceable title to land and unrestricted right to transfer 
land and all its potential uses through a market sale.  The theoretical argument for 
such a system is that it is supposed to allocate land efficiently, by establishing a 
market-clearing price.  For simplicity, this system will be called ‘private property in 
land’.   Ideology aside, the private property regime has the practical advantage 
(stressed by the World Bank, for example), that land can serve as collateral for 
obtaining credit.  By definition, land can serve this function only if the occupant of 
land can be dispossessed of it through a formal legal process.  In the absence of a right 
to seize land in payment of debts, the loan-providing institution must base its lending 
on some message of income flow.  Lending on the basis of income flow is the rule in 
business lending in developed countries.  It is rare in commercial agricultural lending 
in developing countries, due to the extreme difficulties of measuring potential income 
flows.  Private property relations by-pass this problem by allowing for foreclosure on 
debts. 
 
 The practical advantage of the private property regime is also its problem, for 
the vendibility aspect, which is the sine qua non of private property, is, by definition, 
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the vehicle for complete loss of land security.  Thus, the practical question arises 
whether in each concrete circumstance private property is the ownership framework 
in which smallholders will be best motivated to invest and improve land.28  Many 
experts argue that this is not the case in the sub-Saharan countries.29  This conclusion 
is reach because, 1) the systems of communal land holding and distribution in the 
region is the basis for the sustainability of communities and the organisation of 
labour, which is frequently the binding constraint on agricultural production;  and 2)  
in the absence of safety-nets, private property would facilitate landlessness and 
poverty more than commercialisation.  None-the-less, those that advocate private 
property for the region are correct in their assessment that prevailing communal 
tenure systems, based upon land-extensive cultivation, are probably not sustainable.  
Thus, change will come in some form, and it is preferable that this be formalised and 
orderly.  With this point in mind, a study for the FAO gave the following 
recommendations for tenure reform in the sub-Saharan region. 
 
 
 To facilitate sustainability of land access and foster adjustment to 
increased commercialisation, land policy in the sub-Saharan countries 
would be based on the following guidelines: 
1. formalisation of land rights through issuance of titles in those areas 
where competition for land is intense; 
2. the creation of private property and associated land markets is not 
advisable, for it would increase inequality, given the imperfect credit and 
capital markets, and foster social and political imbalances; therefore, 
3.  official registration of land rights should not be limited to issuing titles 
to individuals, but also include titles for groups, communities, other forms 
of voluntary associations (perhaps based on traditional links such as 
kinship. (Platteau 1992) 
  
                                                          
28 In a study for the FAO of rural informal credit markets, Sarris stresses the importance of 
understanding the dynamics of private land markets: 
For agriculture…the periodic ‘distress sales of assets’ by small agricultural households could 
be a mechanism through which their poverty is perpetuated.  Understanding this process might 
help design more effective growth and macro policies. (Sarris 1996, p. 103) 
29 Platteau (1992, p. 127) summarises the problem as follows: 
…[I]t is evident…that all those who argue in favour of the granting of legal land titles to 
landholders on the grounds that it will facilitate their access to credit imply that land must be 
made a transferable…asset.  It is precisely the possibility of foreclosing o the land 
mortgaged…that drives credit-givers to grant larger amounts of credit at cheaper terms.  Yet, 
it is precisely this aspect of the mechanism of easing credit that is the most debatable since it 
opens a huge avenue leading to landlessness and land concentration. 
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IV.  Policy Areas 
 
 This section reviews the major policy areas that affect agriculture.  This 
discussion provides the background for the subsequent consideration of policy 
opportunities and constraints associated with the WTO and structural adjustment 
programmes.  While policy areas can be treated generally, it should be kept in mind 
that the various developing regions (and countries) has special problems which affect 
design, selection and implementation.  These are briefly listed in Table 2, which while 
not exhaustive, indicates issues of major importance. 
 
Table 2: 
Special Issues of Agricultural Policy, by Region 
Region Special issues & problems 
North Africa & the 
Middle East 
Water management, high food import levels, armed conflict, 
lack of rural employment opportunities, low proportion of 
arable land, pastoral grazing 
 
The sub-Sahara Land tenure, shift to land intensive technologies, high degree of 
subsistence production, land degradation, armed conflict 
 
South Asia Landlessness, population pressure 
 
East & Southeast Asia Population pressure, transitional economies 
 
Latin America Concentrated land distribution, landlessness 
 
 
1.  Macroeconomic policies 
 
Macroeconomic policies can be broadly defined as policies which use 
instruments that impact upon the economy as whole, seeking outcomes which 
refer to aggregate economic performance. 
 
Anti-inflation measures.  Recent research, notably a World Bank working 
paper, suggests that for inflation rates between zero and forty percent, there appears to 
be no correlation with growth rates.  For rates above forty percent the relationship is 
negative;  at rates near zero, reducing inflation also reduces growth (Bruno & Easterly 
1995).30  Thus, most governments find themselves with inflation rates which are 
problem neutral with regard to growth.   Some argue that inflation has a negative 
effect on the agricultural sector, but there is no consensus on this issue.  The outcome 
is influenced by the institutional framework and the rate of inflation itself.  Very high 
rates of inflation tend to be associated with a range of maladies, and is detrimental to 
                                                          
30 Stiglitz, chief economist of the World Bank, summarises research findings on inflation as follows: 
The evidence has shown only that high inflation is costly. Bruno and Easterly found that when 
countries cross the threshold of 40 per cent annual inflation, they fall into a high-inflation/low 
growth trap.  Below that level…there is little evidence that inflation is costly.  Barro and 
Fischer…fail to find any evidence that low levels of inflation are costly….Akerlof, Dickens and 
Perry [find] that low levels of inflation may even improve economic performance relative to 
what it would have been with zero inflation.  
…In my view, the conclusion to be drawn…is that controlling high inflation [i.e., above 40 
percent per annum] should be a fundamental policy priority, but that pushing low inflation even 
lower is not likely to significantly improve the functioning of markets.  (Stiglitz 1998, p. 8) 
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all sectors.  For moderate rates of inflation the situation is considerably more 
complicated.31  If farmers are net debtors (which is usually the case), their debts 
decline in real terms as a result of inflation.  If, at the same time, crop prices are 
determined in free markets, and inflation is relative price neutral, then the real debt 
burden will fall, even if real interest rates are constant.  However, the net effect of 
moderate inflation is more complicated than this, and no a priori judgement can be 
made.   
 
 To assess the effect of inflation on the agricultural sector, one should 
distinguish between 
1. high rates of inflation, which are detrimental to all sectors;   and 
2. moderate inflation, whose impact on agriculture depends (among other 
things) on institutional arrangements, the input mix in production, sectoral 
output composition, tradability of output, and the extent of indexing in 
agriculture and other sectors. 
The impact of inflation on agriculture is also dependent on the 
government’s policy messages in response to inflation. 
 
In the 1990s there has been a strong political commitment to low inflation, at 
the country level and in the international financial institutions.  Reducing inflation can 
be achieved through monetary instruments, fiscal instruments, or the exchange rate. 
 
In principle there are two monetary instruments for affecting the price level.  
Acting directly to reduce the money supply reduces the growth of the money value of 
output.  If wages and prices are flexible, reducing the money supply should have no 
effect on output, and merely lower the price level (or slow its rate of increase).  In the 
more realistic case wages and prices do not adjust instantaneously, so output declines.  
Thus, almost all economists (and policy makers) consider a restricting money growth 
to have a real output cost.  In most developing countries it is not possible to act 
directly on the money supply.  This is achieved by use of so-called open market 
operations, in which the government sells its bonds to the private sector, thus taking 
money out of circulation.  Only the more advanced developing countries have bond 
markets sufficiently sophisticated and broadly based to use this instrument effectively.  
As an alternative, the government (or an independent Central Bank) can raise interest 
rates.  By making credit more expensive, this reduces the demand for money.  It also 
discourages investment.  Raising interest rates invariably has an output cost. 
 
 Fiscal deficits are commonly viewed as inflationary, but this need not be the 
case.  If a fiscal deficit is financed by the sale of government bonds (debt) to the 
private sector, the effect on the money supply (and, thus, on inflation) is in principle 
                                                          
31 Boussard suggests that 'it is likely that any successful measure against inflation can be considered as 
highly beneficial for smallholders’ (Boussard 1992, p. 54).  He bases this generalisation on two effects:  
that control of inflation results in lower real interest rates, and has a positive effect on rural saving.  
Empirical evidence on the first point is ambiguous.  The period during which inflation is being reduced 
is typically characterised by higher real interest rates, for they are one of the instruments for restricting 
money growth.  Once inflation is lowered, real interest rates have tended to fall in developed countries, 
but frequently remained higher in developing countries.  For the latter set of countries this may be due 
to the combination of capital account liberalisation and persistence of inflationary exceptions.  With 
regard to saving, the impact is also mixed.  The outcome is affected by the portion of saving (and 
investment) which is monetised. 
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neutral.32  If the deficit is financed by the government borrowing money from the 
public sector (most commonly from the Central Bank), the money supply increases, 
creating inflation pressure (if output does not respond completely to absorb the 
increased monetary demand).  Since bond markets are narrow in most developing 
countries, deficits are typically financed by borrowing from the public sector.  It is 
this process which is inaccurate called ‘printing money’.  When deficits are financed 
by borrowing form the public sector, deficit reduction reduces the growth of the 
money supply, and, thus, potential inflationary pressures. 
 
Exchange rate appreciation directly reduces inflationary pressures because it 
lowers the domestic currency cost of imported commodities (if the relevant markets 
are competitive), and exchange rate depreciation is potentially inflationary.  Few 
countries employ the exchange rate as an primary instrument of inflation control, 
because of the undesirable side-effects (e.g., reducing export competitiveness). 
 Finally, it should be noted that in countries receiving relatively large official 
development assistance or private foreign investment, inflationary pressures may be 
almost beyond the control of the government (see sterilisation, below).  
 
 Fiscal deficit.    While fiscal deficits may not be inflationary (this depends on 
how they are financed), they can create other problems.  If the deficit is such that 
public sector debt accumulates faster than the economy grows, then debt service 
payments will rise as a portion of public expenditure.  This will tend to put pressure 
on expenditures in other areas.  To avoid this, a ‘golden rule’ is proposed, in which 
deficits are always no larger than government investment expenditure;  i.e., the 
government, like the private sector, should borrow to invest, not to consume. 
 
 Exchange rate.  Developing country governments use four types of exchange 
rate regimes.  A few countries maintain fixed exchange rates.  Most of these countries 
are small, with their exchange rates tied to that of a large neighbour.  For example, 
Botswana pegs the pula to the South African rand.  The largest group of countries 
with fixed exchange rates are the members of the CFA franc zone, with national 
currencies pegged to the French franc.  Closely akin to the fixed exchange rate is the 
currency board.  This regime establishes a strict relationship between the supply of 
the domestic currency and Central Bank holdings of foreign exchange.  In principle, a 
government could operate a currency board system without a fixed exchange rate.  In 
practice, currency boards almost always operate with a pegged exchange rate (e.g., in 
Argentina pegged to the US dollar).  The drawback of a currency board is its 
potentially destabilising effect.   If the exchange rate is fixed, then the domestic 
money supply rises and falls with inflows and outflow of foreign exchange.  
Fluctuations in foreign exchange holdings can be ‘smoothed’ through international 
borrow, though this can create its own problems.  At the other end of the spectrum is 
the freely floating exchange rate.  In principle this involves a completely non-
interventionist regime, in which the government leaves the exchange rate to be 
determined by private trading.  There are few examples of this free market ideal.  
Low-income countries that have implemented with freely floating rates have not 
infrequently had disastrous experiences.  There are several reasons for this.  Perhaps 
important, the foreign exchange market for small countries can be quite narrow and 
                                                          
32 Some argue that there is an investment-depressing effect through ‘crowding out’.  Increased public 
demand for money raises interest rates, which reduces investment.  There is very little empirical work 
on crowding out in developing countries. 
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easily manipulated by either foreign or domestic traders.  As a practical matter, many 
low-income countries receive official capital flows relatively large compared to the 
private sector portion of the balance of payments.  Since official capital flows are not 
market-determined, neither can the exchange rate be, except superficially.  Most 
governments implement some variant of a managed exchange rate.  This can take the 
transparent form of announcing a range in which the exchange rate will be maintained 
(through Central Bank foreign exchange transactions), periodic ah hoc interventions 
in foreign exchange markets to prevent unwanted devaluations or appreciations, or 
publicly announced adjustments at specified dates (sometimes called a ‘crawling 
peg’). 
 Because most countries intervene in the determination of exchange rates, this 
policy instrument is particularly important to the agricultural sector.  The 
interventions will affect competitiveness, and the relative return to tradable and non-
tradable commodities.  Since most agricultural products are exported or are 
potentially substitutes for imports, devaluation is considered to be beneficial to the 
sector.  There is some scepticism on this point.  Smith argues that in the sub-Saharan 
countries there are reasons to doubt that the full extent of a devaluation would be 
passed on to agricultural producers (Smith 1991, p. 12).  There are five reasons for 
this: 
 
1. smallholders may have weak bargaining positions vis-à-vis merchants and 
middlemen; 
2.  a substantial component of marketing costs, especially transport, are import-
using, and their prices may increase with devaluation; 
3.  the inflationary effects of the devaluation may increase the non-tradable cost 
of marketing services;   
4. as mentioned elsewhere, the aggregate supply response of most households 
may be small due to land and labour constraints;  and 
5. many incentive goods of the rural sector may be imported, and their prices 
will rise with devaluation.  
 
 Along similar lines, Van Wijnbergen (1986) has argued that devaluation might 
be have a negative effect on aggregate supply in some circumstances, and, in any 
case, will vary by crop because of varying imported input content.  For the economy 
as a whole, there is no consensus among economists as to whether the net effect of a 
devaluation is expansionary or contractionary (Agénor and Monteil 1996, Chapter 7).  
As with most economic policy issues, appropriate exchange rate policy cannot be 
determined purely in the abstract.  The level of development of an economy, the 
structure of its trade, and the efficiency of its markets all affect outcomes.  Further, 
excessive use of the devaluation instrument, if it results in real devaluations, has the 
danger of being merchantilist in both its outcome and motivation. 
 
 If one measures exchange rates in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP),33 a 
real devaluation makes imports more expensive in the domestic market and exports 
cheaper on the world market;  i.e., the devaluation improves competitiveness.  This, 
the traditional approach to devaluation, is now considered theoretically suspect.  The 
current mainstream approach is view the exchange rate as the price of tradable 
                                                          
33 Purchasing power parity is commonly approximated by dividing the nominal exchange rate by the 
domestic rate of inflation, and multiplying it by some measure of ‘ world’ inflation (frequently the US 
wholesale price index is used).  By this measure, an increase indicates a real devaluation. 
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commodities relatively to non-tradable commodities.34  In this analysis, a devaluation 
increases the rate of return to tradables, inducing a shift of resources away from non-
tradables.  This does not in itself make a country’s products more competitive in 
international trade. 
 
 Government expenditure. With regard to macro policy )as opposed to sectoral 
impact), the effect of government expenditure is on the level of output and possible 
inflationary pressures (see anti-inflation measures and fiscal deficit, above). 
 
 Taxation.  See  agricultural taxation, below.  
 
 Interest rate.  Economists’ views on the role of interest rates has changed 
substantially over the last thirty years.  From the end of the Second world War until 
the mid-1970s, there was a virtual consensus that fiscal policy had the function of 
smoothing out the business cycle, and interest rates were set to foster long-term 
growth.  Within this context, long run real interest rates were to conform to a ‘golden 
rule’:  they should equal the long run, sustainable increase in per capita income.  This 
implied, for developing countries, real interest rates should fall within the two to five 
percent range in most cases.  Since the mid-1970s the roles of fiscal and monetary 
policy have switched, so that interest rates are used for short-term stabilisation.  
However, the ‘golden rule’ remains relevant.  If real interest rates exceed the per 
caput rate of growth, this implies a redistribution of income to rentiers.  Since in most 
countries those who receive interest payments have incomes above the national 
average, such a redistribution would be regressive.  For the government, high real 
interest rates would redistribute expenditure from investment and social expenditure, 
on the one hand, to debt service, on the other (see fiscal deficit, above). 
 
 Sterilisation of foreign exchange flows.  If a government allows free or near-
free convertibility of its currency, then inflows of foreign exchange can quickly 
become part of the domestic money supply.  In many developing countries this can 
cause a substantial (and perhaps unanticipated) monetary expansion, as the 
government must create domestic money to satisfy increased demand.  This can be 
particularly important in countries receiving relatively high levels of official 
development assistance  (and there are several such cases in the sub-Saharan region).  
To avoid inflationary pressures, the government must attempt to sterilise foreign 
exchange inflows.  If capital markets are sufficiently developed, this is done by the 
government (Central Bank) selling bonds in an amount equal to the foreign exchange 
it wishes to prevent from increasing the domestic money supply.  If bond markets are 
not sufficiently developed to accommodate these ‘open market’ operations (see anti-
inflation measures, above), there is little a government can do, short of capital 
controls, to prevent the inflationary pressures associated with relatively large foreign 
exchange inflows. 
 
                                                          
34 By this definition, the real exchange rate is measured by an index of the domestic price of tradables 
(usually agriculture, mining and manufacturing) divided by an index of non-tradables (construction, 
transport, and commerce).  An increase in the index indicates a real devaluation.  This theoretical 
approach invokes the assumption of the Law of One Price.  The Law states that if markets are efficient, 
a commodity sells for the same price in every market, excluding transport and insurance costs.  If one 
assumes the Law to hold, a devaluation cannot improve competitiveness (e.g., every country’s coffee 
sells at the same price, regardless of national exchange rates). 
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Macroeconomic policies can have important affects on the environmental 




2.  Taxation of agriculture 
 
 In this section we consider taxation as such, excluding other potential 
instruments of resource flows between agriculture and other sectors, for example, the 
exchange rate (which are treated separately).  There is a substantial literature on 
taxation of agriculture in developing countries, whose main thrust is that the sector 
has tended to suffer from an excessive burden.  Based upon theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence form a wide range of countries, the studies typically conclude that  
in most developing countries 1)  there has been a net transfer of resources from 
agriculture to non-agricultural sectors (see previous section);  2) the excessive 
taxation has had a detrimental effect on agricultural performance;  and  3) reducing 
the taxation of agriculture would improve performance substantially. 
 
 These empirical studies must be placed in analytical context. The role of the 
state tends to increase in the process of development, because, as Sarris has observed, 
‘the growing complexity in a developing economy necessitates the increased 
provision of public goods, such as infrastructure, defence, education, etc.’ (Sarris 
1994, p. 1).  For low-income countries, the only practical source of taxation is the 
agricultural sector, due to the structure of the economy.  In developed countries, the 
overwhelming proportion of tax revenue is collected through medium and large scale 
businesses, as personal income taxes withheld at the source, profits taxes, or taxes on 
sales (with value added taxes, VAT, being most important in the European Union).  
Income taxes on the self-employed and taxes on small businesses play a relatively 
unimportant role.  These activities are relatively small, and the cost of collection 
relatively high.  In low income countries, the corporate business sector is small, and 
the capacity to tax correspondingly low.35  In this structural situation, there will be a 
tendency for governments to derive their revenue from international trade, through 
taxes on imports and exports.  While such taxes may have undesirable effects on 
production and consumption incentives (see below), governments have little 
alternative. 
 
 Since in low income countries exports tend to come overwhelmingly from 
agriculture, the share of the sector’s income which is taxed tends to be greater than for 
the economy a whole.  Further, if a country is to modernise through some form of 
industrialisation, it will be inevitable that the expenditure to agriculture in the form of 
social services, production services (e.g., agricultural extension services), and 
investment, will be less than the revenue collected from the sector.  In the context, we 
can conclude that the debate should not be over whether or not this imbalance should 
occur, but the desirable extent of it.  Several justifications have been given for taxing 
agriculture disproportionately to the expenditure it receives (Sarris 1994, pp. 8-9). 
                                                          
35 An exception to this rule is low income countries which have a substantial natural resource sector 
exploited by private corporations (e.g., Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1970s). 
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1.  if aggregate supply in agriculture is relatively price inelastic (as is almost 
certainly the case),36 taxation will tend to have a correspondingly low impact 
on depressing output;  and 
2. if the chief beneficiaries of higher agricultural prices are wealthy 
landowners, then taxation (which could fall predominantly on these producers) 
has positive equity effects;  and 
3.  as a practical matter, agricultural taxes in low income countries will tend to 
fall on export products, not domestic food products, which contributes to 
relatively low urban food prices. 
 As an alternative to export taxes, some authors have proposed taxes on land.  
While in principle land taxes are more economically efficient than taxes on output, in 
practice they are beyond the administrative capacity of governments in low-income 
countries.  To implement a land tax, a government requires:  1) an up-to-date registry 
of ownership, area, and location for each landholder;  and 2) a current valuation of 
each land holding.  Even in developed countries these are expensive and time-
consuming to achieve.  In low-income countries they are impossible in practice.37  In 
many developing countries (especially in the sub-Saharan region), there is not 
complete titling of land, which is the prior condition to a registry of ownership.  
Second, were there a complete and accurate registration of ownership, land evaluation 
requires extensive land markets (Norton 1987, p. 61).  If land is not generally bought 
and sold, governments have no practical basis for assigning the land values upon 
which taxation would be based.  Evaluation can be avoided through a lump-sum tax 
on land (equal absolute tax on all holdings regardless of size or quality.  Such a tax 
would still require a land registry.  Even were such a registry in existence, lump sum 
taxes suffer from two near-fatal problems.  First, they are grossly inequitable, being 
the purest form of regressive taxation.  Second, in order not to over-burden the 
poorest farmers to the point of driving them from production, lump sum taxes need be 
set so low that they generate very little revenue. 
 
The structural limits to taxation in developing countries leads Sarris to provide 
what can be considered the practical conclusion to reach about taxation of 
agriculture: 
…[T]axing exportable or other tradeable cash crops has had a long and 
successful history as a fiscal instrument in many countries…. It is not 
coincidence that export taxation has been quite crucial as a source of revenue 
at early stages of development…[T]rade taxes (export and (import) account for 
the bulk of fiscal revenue in the poorest developing countries. (Sarris 1994, p. 
15) 
 
 Though disproportionate taxation of agriculture (in practice, export 
agriculture) is unavoidable, it remains the case that excessive levels have a negative 
effect on current output and long-term agricultural growth.  The practical problem for 
governments is to determine, in each case, what level of taxation is ‘excessive.’  This 
                                                          
36 Short run supply curves by definition hold technology and land area constant.  With a constant 
technology and fixed land, the total supply response to price changes should be low.  This is in practice 
what empirical research shows (Chhibber 1989; FAO 1987, pp. 2-3; and Smith 1991, p. 12).  This is 
consistent with the short run supply response of individual crops to changes in relative crop prices 
being quite high.  The latter is achieved by the transfer of land, labour and equipment form one crop to 
another. 
37 ‘The difficulties and costs of establishing effective property rights…are likely to be pronounced… 
because of incomplete commercialisation and modernisation’ (Smith & Thomson 1991, p. 108). 
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involves explicit evaluation of trade-offs between objectives, and between gains and 
losses.  For example, it is well-documented in the development literature that public 
sector investment in education yields a high return in terms of overall economic 
growth and the potential to diversify the economy in response to changing world 
market conditions.  The gains from the transfer of resources from agriculture to 
growth-enhancing public goods can be justified on this basis.  This is all the more the 
case if the private return to education and other social services (e.g., health care) is 
exceeded by the social return.38 
  
 The review of the issues associated with agricultural taxation in 
developing countries permits only the broadest of generalisations. 
1. all forms of taxation tend to discourage production, since in theory 
they reduce the relative return to work, thus inducing greater leisure; 
2. as a practical matter, developing countries, especially low income 
countries, may have no major revenue source other than export 
agriculture;  and 
3. the degree to which agriculture is taxed cannot be determined from a 
consideration of its impact on agriculture alone, but must be assessed in 




3.  Agricultural Credit 
 
 After price policy, the most contentious policy area is credit, focussing on the 
conditions under which it should be provided and the appropriate institutions for its 
delivery.  It is beyond the scope of this guide to cover all issues.  The focus is on 
credit terms and the issue of credit subsidies. 
 
 Any policy discussion of rural credit should be bring with recognition of the 
particular character of the commodity, credit, which is being bought and sold.  
Consumer theory analyses exchange in terms of income and substitution effects.  
When the price of a commodity changes, rises, for example, there is an income effect 
which is the real income loss to the buyer of the higher price for this particular 
commodity.  If the quantity purchased remained the same, there would be a real 
income loss in terms of the need to purchase less of all other commodities taken 
together.  The income effect is partially mitigated by the substitution effect:  the buyer 
reduces purchases of the commodity whose price has risen, and substitutes for it 
purchases of a (now) cheaper commodity which can sure the same purchase.  The 
larger is the substitution effect (the more price elastic the demand for the commodity), 
the less is the real income loss. 
 
 The key characteristic of credit is that it has no substitute as such, for it is the 
commodity (money) which is used to purchase others (e.g., agricultural inputs).  Since 
                                                          
38 Sarris generalises this point to public investment as a whole: 
It is almost an axiom of [structural adjustment programmes] that private savings and hence 
investment will be more efficient [than public investment] from a growth perspective.  
However, much private saving in developing countries goes for consumption smoothing and 
not for productive investment…Given risks, economies of scale, etc., it is not at all clear that in 
a developing country context private investment will be more efficient than public…’(Sarris 
1994, p. 114). 
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no other commodity can sure this purpose, when interest rates rise, farmers must 
either draw down on saving, reduce input use, or seek another source of credit.  In 
other words, the price (interest rate) elasticity of credit for the small holder is likely to 
be low, implying a relatively large real income effect of interest changes.  A second 
characteristic, specific to agricultural credit, is that rural credit markets tend to be 
inefficient, due to market power and information asymmetries between borrowers and 
lenders.  This frequently results in fragmented credit markets, with interest rates and 
repayment conditions varying across them.  Further, when the degree of 
commercialisation of communities is low, credit is part of patron-client 
relationships.39  While attaching oneself to a patron may provide a type of security for 
a smallholder, it limits his or her choice in the credit market. 
 
 A second aspect of credit as a commodity is that its price (the interest rate) 
tends to vary inversely with the amount:  large borrowers typically pay lower rates 
than small borrowers.  While this is not uncommon for many commodities due to 
monopsony power, with credit it can occur in a competitive market.  Particularly in 
developing countries, the unit cost of lending and collecting increases as the size of 
loan falls.  For very small loans, relevant to smallholders, the unit costs of lending can 
be extremely high. 
 
 The debate over whether credit should be subsidised should be placed in the 
context of the differential cost of lending by size of loan.  If non-subsidised credit to 
farmers means full recovery of cost plus the normal profit margin for each size 
category of loan, then smallholders must be charged more than larger farmers.  If 
producers are price-responsive, this will imply that for a given technology, 
smallholders will use fewer modern inputs, producer lower yields, and have lower 
returns per unit of on-farm labour.  In light of this, it should be noted that the AonA 
permits special credit programmes targeted to poor households.  
 
  
4.  Price Policy in General 
  
 In most developing countries, the thrust of agricultural price policy over the 
last fifteen years has been towards reduction of government interventions.  The hope 
is that this deregulation would increase prices to farmers, and thus stimulate greater 
output in the short run and investment in the medium term.  As such deregulation does 
not increase prices;  rather, it’s affect is to facilitate the transmission of price changes 
to the farmgate.  When domestic market deregulation is combined with trade 
liberalisation (see trade liberalisation, below), international prices tend to dominate 
domestic markets (with the degree partly dependent on the size of the country).  Price 
decreases are transmitted as well as price increases. 
 
 In this context, one can distinguish between the initial impact of deregulation 
and the long-term consequence.  If institutional arrangements prior to deregulation 
were such as to hold agricultural prices below international levels, then, other things 
equal, deregulation will provoke an increase.  This is a once-and-for all increase, after 
                                                          
39 Gaiha comments, ‘Capital markets [in rural areas] are…far from perfect.  The fundamental reasons 
are the high risk of default and weak enforcement mechanisms’ (Gaihi 193, p. 63).  Credit through 
patron-client relationships, seeks to resolve these problems, at considerable cost to the smallholder. 
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which price levels depend upon the trend in world markets.  This issue is treated 
further, below. 
 
 Were average farm incomes the only consideration for price policy, the issue 
would be relatively simple.  Full deregulation would imply that these incomes would 
be determined by international prices.  The FAO concern with price policy involves 
more complex issues, since central to its brief is food security.  In order to evaluate 
price policy for the goal of food security, one must disaggregate the farm sector, and 
take an economy-wide perspective.  FAO estimates suggest that the number of 
seriously undernourished people in the developing world was about 500 million in the 
mid-1980s (FAO 1987, p. 3), and not much lower in the mid-1990s (FAO 1998).  A 
substantial portion of this number consists of households that are net food buyers, in 
rural as well as urban areas (FAO 1998).  In the absence of compensating policies, 
increases in food prices make net food buyers worse off.  Thus, price policy for food 
security must be nuanced, in order to pursue the goals of improved incentives for 
producers and enhancing the welfare of food deficit households. 
 
 The debate over appropriate price policy has focussed on two issues:  1) 
whether increased market prices are transmitted to the farm gate, and, if so, 2) 
whether price increases are sufficient to bring forth a significant supply response.  
Both issues can only be resolved empirically.  Assume that all commodity marketing 
is privatised and deregulated.  The transmission of prices to the farm gate will depend 
on the degree of market control by merchants.  This control can be affected through 
spot prices, or via systems in which poor farmers pledge their crops in advance of 
harvest.  Supply response will depend on the circumstances in each country, region, 
and community, including:  transport facilities and transport costs;  access to land and 
other inputs;  availability of credit. 
 
 
 5.  Trade liberalisation 
 
 The impact of trade liberalisation on agriculture depends on the particular 
marketing institutions in a country, the exchange rate regime, and the behaviour of 
world prices after liberalisation.  In order to organise the discussion, we assume that a 
government simultaneously undertakes the following policy changes: 
 
1.  quotas are converted to tariffs, the resulting tariff structure is narrowed, and 
the overall level of tariffs lowered;  this gives imports greater access to the 
domestic market (eliminating quotas) and lowers their prices (lower tariffs);  
these changes would be associated with the UR and adjustment programmes; 
2.  price controls are eliminated;  this will tend to affect export crops, since 
price controls in domestic markets were unlikely to have been enforceable 
(adjustment conditionality);  and 
3. a floating exchange rate regime is introduced (adjustment conditionality). 
 
 Table 3 summarises the probable outcomes from this combination of policies.  
The table incorporates simplifying assumptions:  1) access to credit is unaffected by 
the policy changes;  2) changes in world prices become changes in domestic market 
prices, and these are transmitted to the farmgate; 3)  profit margins are determined by 
output prices and inputs prices (no change in cost of non-traded inputs);  and 4) farm 
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households respond to increases (decreases) in profit margins by increasing 
(decreasing) output.  On these assumptions, the output response of farmers is 
determined by the following chain of price changes:  the impact of liberalisation on 
output and input prices, the movement in the exchange rate, the effect (if any) of 
domestic price decontrol, the subsequent movement in world prices of outputs and 
inputs. 
 
 The most favourable scenario for agricultural producers is when trade 
liberalisation reduces input prices, the exchange rate depreciates, and world prices 
rise.  However, there are other scenarios, and no a priori conclusion is possible.  
 
 Some generalisations about the outcome of trade liberalisation are 
possible (on the ceterius paribus assumption): 
1. if not accompanied by a real devaluation, the impact of trade 
liberalisation will tend to be stronger on the import side;  if farmers 
produce tradables, this could increase competition and lower farmgate 
prices; 
2. if accompanied by a real devaluation, crops that do not use imported 
inputs will become profitable relatively to ones that do;  and 
3. critical to all outcomes are the direct and indirect effects of trade 
liberalisation and devaluation on non-traded costs, such as transport, 
wages, and marketing services. 
 
 During the 1990s most developing countries altered their policies toward 
liberalising trade;  this should continue for the foreseeable future.  Trade liberalisation 
is not an all-or-nothing policy.  It is quite consistent with WTO rules to pursue it at a 
pace consistent with national priorities and circumstances.  Its implementation 
requires careful planning, with consideration of short-term as well as long term 
impact, in order to balance policy goals.  Norton summarises the complexities as 
follows: 
 
…[T]rade liberalization may favor a more efficient allocation of resources in 
the long run, but in the short run it may aggravate the balance of payments 
situation… In the economy-wide context, [there are] a number of major 
tradeoffs of this kind, including devaluation vs. reduction in inflation, credit 
contraction vs. output expansion, and tariff reductions vs. reductions in the 
trade deficit. (Norton 1987, p. 11) 
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* It is possible that the depreciation would overcome the fall in world prices and increase in input 
prices (thus, increasing output), but this is not the probable outcome. 
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 6.  Economic policies for the environment 
 
 Economic policy for agriculture must focus not only on production, poverty 
and food security, but on the effect of pursuing these policies on the environment.  
Increasingly, the term ‘sustainable development’ is used in place of ‘economic 
development’.  Superficially, it would appear that economics has the tools to analyse 
sustainability, environmental issues, since environmental sustainability has its costs 
and benefits.  However, in practice economics is not well-equipped for this task, since 
its tools confine it to consideration of costs and benefits which have a monetary cost.  
While in principle all benefits and costs can be converted to monetary units, in many 
cases doing so excludes many of the issues which are most important to analyse.  This 
is especially the case when the environmental changes under consideration have 
potentially catastrophic effects (such as long run climate change or species extinction) 
that render the standard ceterius paribus assumption inappropriate.  Economics is 
useful for formulating environmental policy, but should make modest claims for the 
insights it provides.   
 
 The purpose of this section is not to consider environmental policy in the sense 
of how governments should achieve sustainable development.  Nor does it consider 
the environmental impact of pesticides, irrigation, and other aspects of production 
techniques.  Rather, it considers the environmental impact of typical economic 
measures whose purpose is to enhance agricultural production and foster food 
security.  Within this limited brief, we bring with a brief review of the sectors of 
agriculture and the pressing environmental issues associated with them.  For the crop 
sector, the main issues are over-exploitation of land, expansion onto margin land, 
impact of irrigation and water conservation in general, and the effect of fertilisers and 
other chemical inputs.40  The possibility of endemic over-exploitation of land is in the 
sub-Saharan countries is considered a serious possibility (Platteau 1992).  This region 
has traditionally used land-extensive production techniques, but population growth 
threatens to make this unsustainable due to land scarcity.41  Land scarcity, in turn, 
provokes use of marginal lands.  The task of economic policies is to enhance 
incentives for sustainable use of such land, rather fostering a short term profit horizon 
for producers. 
 
 A much more complicated sector for economic and social policy is forestry, 
because of the many competing demands on forest resources.  Forests serve many 
functions and groups, whose interests are not necessarily compatible: 
 
 a. forests are the homelands of many indigenous peoples, for whom hunting 
and gathering may be important for their livelihoods;  typically, these people 
have relatively little influence on economic or social policy; 
                                                          
40 In the last two years the virtues and vices of genetically modified products have become an issue of 
intense political debate in both developed and underdeveloped countries, as well as a source of conflict 
in trade negotiations.  In February 1999, the United Nations convened a conference in Colombia to 
establish an international protocol on GM commodities.  This issue is beyond the scope of this report. 
41 Land scarcity is a relative concept.  Two countries could have the same rural population density, and 
land could be scarce in one country and abundant in the other.  Abundance or scarcity depends, among 
other things, on land quality and the techniques used to till the land.  Land as becoming scarce in the 
sub-Saharan region in relation to the techniques that continue to be employed by most rural 
households. 
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 b. forests are the habitat for a range of species, which would be threatened by 
commercial exploitation of these woodlands; 
 c. forests supply a many inputs which are of central importance to both 
developing and developed countries;  a major restriction on forest exploitation 
would have costly effects; 
 d. forests play a central role in the natural regulation of climates, by prevention 
of soil erosion, water retention, maintenance of micro-climates, and, on a 
global scale, conversion of carbon dioxide into oxygen (countering the ‘green 
house’ effect). 
 
 It is beyond the method of economics to provide the weights to apply to the 
various aspects of forests, though to an extent and imperfectly economics can offer 
quantitative measures of alternative outcomes.  Some overall guide to weights is 
provided currently by an apparent weight of opinion that commercial exploitation of 
forests has been pursued excessively compared to longer term considerations.42 
 
 Table 3 gives a guide to probable impacts of economic policy on 
environmental variables and outcomes, which policy makers would review along with 
the strictly economic outcomes that various policies are intended.  We bring with 
fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies, which are short run in that their impact is 
intended to be realised immediately.  For fiscal policy, government expenditure is an 
instrument which can be used for both macroeconomic goals and environmental 
improvement, with minimal conflict.  Expenditure can be switched form 
environmentally damaging programmes to ones that conserve resources and reduce 
pollution.  Investing in facilitates that capture rainwater, rather than wells (which 
might reduce water tables) is an example.  At the macroeconomic level, increases in 
the general level of taxation would tend to lower demand and, thus, resource use, 
though this is unlikely to ever be the prime motivation for tax increases.  This 
instrument and subsidies are more appropriately considered under pricing policy, 
though each has an effect on aggregate demand. 
 
 At the macroeconomic level, monetary policies affect the supply and demand 
for credit, through the interest rate or other mechanisms.  As with the demand-
reducing effect of reduction in government expenditure, more tightly rationed credit 
(via the interest rate or quantity rationed) would be expected to reduce the demand 
and use of farm inputs and discourage the acquisition of machinery.  The direct 
impact might be favourable to the environment, though in a perverse manner.  All 
demand contract reduces aggregate resource use, but at the cost of lower standards of 
living.  Higher interest rates combined with fiscal or exchange rate policies that 
compensate for demand reduction might be considered favourable to the environment, 
by discouraging use of chemical fertilisers, pesticides and other environment-
damaging inputs.  Reduced use of machinery might also, in some contexts be judged 
as environmentally favourable.  However, one cannot generalise.  If credit and, 
                                                          
42 In an FAO study, Markandya writes 
On the basis of approximate data, the world was losing about 12.4 million hectares a year of 
tropical forests in the 1980s.  This was from a stock of 1.16 billion hectares.  Concern has been 
expressed because of the range of services that forests perform, many of which are not 
replaceable…It is well established that the purposes for which forests are cleared are mainly 
agricultural colonisation…and unsustainable commercial logging.’ (Markandya 1994, pp. 17-
18) 
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therefore, modern inputs, become more expensive, farmers may switch to more land-
extensive techniques which could prove more damaging to the environment than 
chemical inputs.  The use of machinery, for clearing land, for example, may be less 
environmentally damaging than traditional techniques such as burning off ground 
cover.  The net outcome for the environment depends upon the nature of soils, 
prevailing techniques, and the broader environmental context. 
 
 It is also difficult to generalise about the impact of exchange rate policy on the 
environment.  On the import side, a real devaluation will, ceterius paribus, increase 
the cost of imported inputs.  As with credit tightening, this may or may not have a 
favourable environmental effect.  In the 1990s, devaluation has in many countries 
been combined with trade liberalisation.  Since the latter would tend to reduce the cost 
of imported inputs, the net effect on input use must be reviewed in each case.  On the 
export side, a real devaluation tends to foster production for the external market, 
either through increased competitiveness or by raising the relative return to tradables 
(see discussion of exchange rates, above).  There is controversy over whether 
increased agricultural exports have a positive, neutral or negative effect on the 
environment.  For crops, devaluation is unlikely to substantially increase aggregate 
production.  Rather, its affect is to induce a switch between crops.  If this is the case, 
the environmental impact will depend on the specific crops involved;  e.g., their use 
of chemical inputs.  One frequently suggested negative impact of increased exports is 
the possibility that the expansion of exports will result in localised concentration of 
production, which might enhance the emergence and spread of crop diseases.  There 
is relatively little empirical work on this issue. 
 
 The situation is different for the forestry sector.  Much, if not most, of the 
exploitable forest area in the developing world has not been purpose-grown for 
commercial use.  As a result, devaluation, and other export incentives, might, in the 
absence of strict government regulations, result in unsustainable commercial 
exploitation of forests.43  A similar argument can be made for ocean and free-water 
fishing, though not for fish framing.  For livestock, the environmental impact of an 
export-inducing devaluation is ambiguous, though a bit more problematical than for 
corps.  If a devaluation provokes a shift from crops to livestock, as a result of a 
revealed comparative advantage, the environment may suffer, especially if the shift is 
not reversible in the short run.  On the other hand, the shift to grazing may be 
associated with reduction of crops that heavy users of polluting chemicals (the shift 
from cotton to livestock in Central America in the 1980s might be example).  
 
 For medium and long term impact, governments has four categories of 
policies:  trade, pricing, institutional, and investment.  The direct on trade policy in 
recent years in developing countries has been towards liberalisation (see sections on 
the WTO and structural adjustment).  The conversion of quantitative controls into 
tariffs and tariff reduction tends to increase imports, which may partly be off-set by 
real devaluations.  Reductions in tariffs and in export taxes tend to have different 
effects across commodities, depending on the initial structure of quotas, tariffs and 
taxes.  Before liberalisation, governments typically have a differential tariff and 
                                                          
43 Markandya cities evidence to support this view: 
[Recent studies] show a significant relationship between the rate of industrial logging and the 
debt service ratio, the real rate of devaluation and the export price of agricultural crops… [T]he 
evidence cannot be ignored as indicative of a possible relationship… (Markandya 1994, p. 173) 
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export tax structure;  a common conditionality of adjustment programmes is that these 
differences be narrowed.  The result is that the trade regime becomes more ‘neutral’ 
with regard to incentives by commodity.  No generalisation can be made about the 
environmental impact, though there is growing concern in the policy literature that 
trade liberalisation without purposeful regulations may not serve the goal of 
environmental sustainability.44 
 
 Pricing policy involves three instruments:  prices themselves, which may be 
regulated;  subsidies, usually on inputs;  and taxes on internal trade.  The removal or 
adjustment of these can have environmental effects through their impact on 
incentives, without environmental outcomes depending on the initial policy position 
and the response of different crops. 
 
 Institutional reforms pay a key role in environmental management.  Land 
policies, discussed in Section 3.5, can be used to foster long-term, sustainable 
resource management.  Particularly important in this area are policies which provide 
access to forests, fishing, and grazing.  As discussed above with regard to interest 
rates, the rural financial sector is the vehicle for access to modern inputs.  Research 
and extension services can be focused on environmental sustainability, though both 
are typically weak in developing countries.  If a general point can be made, it is that 
fostering sustainable development is considerably more complicated than reforming 
provision of these services into the private sector.  Environmental considerations, 
perhaps above all others, require a pragmatic and imaginative approach to the roles of 
the public and private sectors (Smith and Thomson 1991, pp. 110ff). 
 
 Perhaps of all medium and long-term policy instruments, public investment 
offers the most possibilities to fostering sustainable development.  Further, few if any 
investment policies would conflict with WTO rules.  The more important external 
constraint is structural adjustment programmes, which place emphasis on deficit 
reduction.  In poor countries, where public services are under-funded, public 
investment tends to be especially vulnerable to expenditure reduction pressures.  
There are many types of investment whose social return is higher than the private 
return, in general and with respect to the environment, which is one of the criteria for 
the public sector taking the initiative.  These include construction of water-catchment 
systems, storage to reduce post-harvest losses, and pest and disease control.  
 
 
                                                          
44 In a study for the FAO, Young and Burton conclude: 
The interaction between international trade and resource degradation is particularly import, 
since the pattern of trade has implications for resource use and environmental policy affects 
comparative advantage… [T]he precise linkages are often difficult to establish… [p. 89] 
[W]here externalities exist the market-determined trade pattern is not socially optimum, [and] 
trade liberalization cannot be relied upon to improve environmental quality, especially in the 
developing countries, and non-tariff barriers on trade may not protect the resource base as 
intended… (Young & Burton 1992, p. 90) 
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Table 3: 
Economic Policies and their Environmental Impacts 
Policy Levels   Environmental impacts 
    Drought relief/food aid/agric extension 
   
Fiscal 
Govt Exp Public infrastructure/environmental 
management 
   
 
Taxes Reduces demand for resources  
   Subsidies Input effect: machinery, 
fertilisers/water, etc. 





Credit Reduced credit for inputs & 
investments 
 Term  Interest 
Rate 
Reduces investment & resource 
management 
     




Import effect:  increases prices of 
imported inputs 
  rate uation Output effect: increased export crops 
(depends on crop characteristics) 









Removal of protection – same effect as 
devaluation but on selected crops 
   Trade 
controls 
Same effect as trade taxes, 
technological lock-in 
     





Rise in official prices, output response 
depends on crop characteristics 
 
  policy Subsidies 
 
Reduced use of pesticides, etc. 
  
Medium & 
 Taxes Indirect impact via reduced resource 
demand 
     
 Long Term  Land Encourages on farm investment and 
long-term sustainable resource 
management 
   
Institutional 
Financial Improved credit mobilisation may 
benefit farmers 
  reforms Research & 
extension 
Improved extension services for 
resource management 
     
   Training Human investments in agric extension, 
wildlife & resource management 




Project evaluation to include 
environmental costs & benefits 
  Policy  
 
Technology 
Industrial pollution abatement 
technologies, adapted agricultural 
technologies 
   Public 
Infra- 
structure 
May increase access to natural 
resources & encourage their 
exploitation, support infrastructure for  
    Producers, enabling greater price 
responsiveness 




V.  External Constraints on Agricultural Policy 
  
1. The WTO and the Agreement on Agriculture 
 
 Over the last twenty years, increasing numbers of governments of developing 
countries have made the political decision to enter into agreements which constrain 
their policy choices, in general and with respect to the agricultural sector.  The most 
important of these are joining the World Trade Organisation and signing onto 
structural adjustment programmes.  This section deals with the implications of the 
former for agricultural policy.  Table 4 lists the eight negotiating ‘rounds’ organised 
within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,45 the main purpose of which was 
to convert all national trade regulations into tariff equivalents (‘tarifficaiton’), and, 
having done so, to bring down the average level of tariffs among consenting 
members.  Until the ‘Dillon Round’ of the early 1960s, the GATT was almost 
exclusively an organisation of developed countries, and did not include a substantial 
number of developing countries until the ‘Tokyo Round’ in the 1970s.  Not until the 
Uruguay Round did GATT negotiations include agricultural commodities in a serious 
manner.  This exclusion was based on the view that food security issues and the 
livelihoods of rural communities should not be left to market forces.46  Prior to the 
UR, agricultural commodities were exempted from important GATT rules such as the 
ban quantitative import restrictions (‘quotas’).  Indeed, subsidies to agricultural 
commodities were explicitly permitted, reflecting their wide-spread use in developed 
countries.  The introduction of agriculture into the UR was justified by some for the 
reason that agricultural trade protection by developed countries especially harmed the 
developing countries.  It cannot be rejected that a significant motivation was the goal 




GATT negotiating rounds: 
Round Date Countries 
Geneva 1947 23 
Annecy 1949 33 
Torquay 1950 34 
Geneva 1956 22 
Dillon 1960-61 45 
Kennedy 1962-67 48 
Tokyo 1973-79 99 
Uruguay 1986-93 118 
FAO 1998a, p. 5 
 
 
 Out of the UR Round came a series of agreements, including the Agreement 
on Agriculture.  Despite the assertion that developing countries would gain from freer 
trade in agricultural commodities, it was explicitly recognised that some or many 
                                                          
45 The GATT was created after the de facto collapse of the International Trade Organisation (proposed 
along with the IMF and the World Bank after World War II), which became non-operational when the 
United States of America declined to ratify it. 
46 ‘The…consensus…[of GATT negotiating countries until the UR] was that agriculture was a unique 
sector of the economy, that, for reasons of national food security, could not be treated like other 
sectors…’(FAO 1998a, p. 5). 
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countries might suffer losses.  In light of this, the agreement included was 
supplemented by a document with the rather long-winded name, the Decision on 
Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on 
Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Countries.  As explained above, the 
purpose of the AonA was not to foster efficiency in the strict economic since (Pareto 
Optimality), but to increase trade in agricultural commodities.   
 
 Prior to considering the details of the AonA, it is useful to summarise the 
consensus view on the likely impact of the UR on world agriculture.  First, and 
perhaps most important, it is anticipated that world trade in agricultural commodities 
will not dramatically increase.  The accepted prediction is that this trade will increase 
by about fifteen billion US dollars (constant prices) over the ten years following the 
agreement.47  Not withstanding this small increase, it is anticipated that total 
agricultural production will decline slightly compared to the 1980s, primarily due to 
the income inelasticity of demand for food as a whole.  Per caput declines are 
expected in dairy products, grains, beef,  and coffee, and increase for vegetable oils, 
tea, bananas, cocoa, and rubber (FAO 1998a, p. 78).  An FAO document confirms  
speculation elsewhere (ODI 1995) that ‘on balance, the Agreement [on Agriculture] 
will lead to a small reduction in consumption growth in low income, food deficit 
countries’ (FAO 198a, p. 78).  This prediction is prompted by anticipated increases in 
prices of basic grains resulting from reduction of subsidies in developed countries.  If 
realised, it would imply an increase in malnutrition in the low-income food deficit 
countries.  It is this possibility that in part prompted the ‘Negative Effects’ Decision, 
that is discussed below. 
 
 In the sub-Saharan region twenty-eight of the fifty countries are defined as 
‘least developed’, and no less than forty-three are low-income food deficit.  Several 
influences associated with the AonA will negatively affect these countries:  1) 
increases in the prices of temperate food commodities;  and 2) preferences from 
developed countries which will be cancelled by the AonA (most associated with the 
Lome Conventions).  When these are added to the small increase in exports facilitated 
by the UR, the net effect on the regional balance of payments is projected to be minus 
200 million US dollars.48  These projects are relevant to food security, which is 
treated in a separate sub-section. 
 
 The basic structure of the AonA is as follows.  The agreement as such sets out 
general rules which ban, limit, or require a progressive reduction in most (but not all) 
forms of producer subsidies and restrictions on commodity trade, but does not specify 
requirements by country.  These are found in the Country Schedules, a statement by 
each member country, commodity by commodity, of commitments on each AonA 
rule (tariffs and non-tariff barriers, domestic support, and export subsidies).  For each 
issue, there is an explanation of how and when the provisions will be achieved.  The 
period of time during which the country commitments will be carried out involves the 
verification process.   The Schedules were required to be submitted (with excepts, see 
below) by December 1993, with verification over by April 1994.  During this period 
                                                          
47 Two good sources for the consensus view are FAO 1998a, pp. 78ff;  and ODI 1995.  On national 
production trends, see Alexandratos 1997. 
48 The estimate is that without the UR, the trade deficit would increase from the present one billion US 
dollars, to 1.5 billion.  With the UR, the deficit increases by a further thirteen percent to 1.7 billion 
(FAO 1998a, p. 80). 
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member countries could inspect and negotiate amendments to each others’ proposed 
Schedules.  After the latter date, the Schedules became legally binding.  The Least 
Developed Countries (see Annex 2 for list) were given an additional year for 
submission and verification.  For developed countries, implementation of the 
Schedules would be within six years from 1995.  Those countries defined as 
‘developing’ were granted a ten year implementation period (i.e., to 2005). 
 
 The policy changes required under the UR (as detailed in the Country 
Schedules) fall into three general categories:  ‘ market access’ , domestic support, and 
export subsidies.  Market access is the term used for conversion of non-trade trade 
measures to tariffs, and consequent reduction of tariff rates.  Domestic support refers 
to payments to producers which are related to levels of production.  The AonA 
required the country schedules to include an item called the Aggregate Measure of 
Support, whose level would be lowered over the compliance period.  This item is of 
limited importance to developing countries, since only the more advanced provided 
any substantial domestic support to producers (see Table 5, for an incomplete list, of 
middle-income countries).  Very few low income countries have or have had such 
measures in place.  In any case, there are notable exceptions to the requirement that 
the AMS be progressively lowered.  Direct support payments are exempted if: 
 
1. for developed countries, exempted are the compensatory payments and 
land set-aside programme of the European Union;  and the deficiency payments of 
the US government (see Annex 1 for definitions); 
2. potentially affecting developing countries, payments to producers 
based on fixed area and yields, or for livestock on a fixed number of head;  and 
3. on a commodity basis, support which is less than ten percent 
(developing countries) or five percent (developed countries) of the total value of 
production is exempted.  
 
 The exemptions are of questionable importance to developing countries, since 
they usually lack the administrative capacity or institutional framework for support 
payments.  Perhaps even more important, support payments represent a transfer from 
other sectors of the economy to agriculture.  In practical terms, this is only possible if 
the population to be supported is relatively small;  i.e., it is beyond the resources of a 
predominantly agricultural country.  Export subsidies are of importance in a number 
of developing countries.  Using 1986-1990 as a base, developing countries must 
reduce expenditure on export subsidies by twenty-four percent by 2004, and reduce 
the volume of subsidised exports by fourteen percent.49  These requirements apply to 
a specific list of commodities which includes virtually very agricultural product of 





Developing Countries with Commitments in Respect of UR Access Quotas,  
Export Subsidies and Domestic Support Reductions 
                                                          
49 For developed countries, the percentages are 36 and 21, respectively, to be achieved by 2000. 
50 The list includes:  wheat and flour, coarse grains, rice, oilseeds, vegetable oils, sugar, butter, 
powdered skim milk, cheese, meat from the common farm animals, live animals, eggs, wine, fruit, 










Africa Morocco X   
 Tunisia X  X 
Asia China X X  
 Indonesia X X  
 Korea, Rep of X  X 
 Malaysia X   
 Philippines X   
 Thailand X  X 
Latin America Barbados X   
& Caribbean Brazil  X X 
 Colombia X X X 
 Costa Rica X  X 
 El Salvador X   
 Guatemala X  X 
 Mexico X X  
 Nicaragua X   
 Uruguay  X  
 Venezuela X X X 
FAO 1998a, p. 69 
 
 
 Above, some of the exemptions to the rules of the AonA were detailed.  All 
the important exemptions and special rules for developing countries are brought 
together, with the purposes of assessing the extent of policy options.  The special 
arrangements for developing countries fall into two categories, extension of deadlines, 
for submission of information and compliance (including exemption of LtDCs from 
the AMS reporting), and the ‘Negative Effects’ Decision, which has yet to be acted 
upon (see Table 6).  Until the commitments under the latter are made concrete, the 
AonA can be considered an arrangement largely designed for the developed countries.  
Indeed, the main purpose of the AonA was, de facto, to reduce the perceived trade-
inhibiting effects of developed country agricultural policy.  As such, the AonA may 
foster agricultural exports of developing countries (see discussion below), but the 
majority of the trade expansion should be among developed countries.  The current 
trade disagreements between the EU and the United States suggest this to be the case. 
 
 Perhaps the most important explicit exemption relevant to food security are 
the arrangements for food aid.  The main change under the AonA is to prohibit 
general sales of food aid at below market prices.  Since such sales have been long-
criticised by experts as having a negative incentive effect on production, developing 
country governments might treat the prohibition as making a necessity of a virtue.  In 
general, all food provision for the poor is formally permitted under the AonA, though 
there remain serious practical problems.  Providing food to the poor requires that they 
be identified;  i.e., it involves targeting.  In many developing countries identification 
at the household level (which targeting requires) is extremely difficult due to lack of 
information and the means to achieve it.  This is particularly the case for nomadic 
populations, urban shanty town dwellers, and remote rural communities.  For the 
same reason that income taxes are not practical in low-income countries, identifying 
the poor is similarly impractical.  The food security advantage of general sales of food 
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below market prices is that this tends to drive down market prices.  For all their 
negative side effects, lower prices raised the purchasing power of food deficit 
households.  While below market sales can be considered inefficient on some grounds 
(the non-poor gain as well as the poor), it is not clear what the practical alternative 
would be if the poor cannot be effectively targeted.   
 
 One possible alternative is the regional assistance allowed under the AonA, if 
the poor are concentrated in certain geographical areas.  This does not, of course, deal 
with the problem of the poor who are reside along with the rich.  It is obvious that 
urban areas have great differences in income levels;  empirical evidence shows that 
rural communities, even in the sub-Saharan, are typically characterised by an unequal 
distribution of income.  With the greater emphasis on market forces in recent years, it 
has been suggested that poverty is largely the result of market imperfections.  The 
implication of this approach is that governments can pursue poverty alleviation 
through improving the functioning of markets (Gaiha 1993).  While this may be part 
of the problem of poverty, the geographic and frequently ethnic concentration of 
poverty suggests more fundamental causes, which require more purposeful 
government action. 
 
 Finally the AonA exemptions include food aid for natural disasters, but the 
Agreement is silent on disasters arising form civil conflict.  It would appear that the 
latter generate considerably more hunger and malnutrition than the former, and tend 
to be more protracted in their impact.  Recent research suggests that in the context of 
conflict, general provision of food is preferable to targeting (Cramer & Weeks 1998).  
This is because provision of food is part of a broader process of social reconciliation.  
Targeting may revive or aggravate perceptions of exclusion and favouritism that 
contributed to armed conflict.  An important future refinement on the AonA might be 
to make explicit provisions for conflict-affected countries. 
 
 FAO technical work increasingly focuses on aiding governments to provide 
food security for their populations, especially for vulnerable groups.  The implications 




Special Rules for Developing Countries and Relevant General Exemptions 
Under the Agreement on Agriculture 
Special Arrangement Type: Details: 
1. Country Schedules Least Developed Countries given additional year to submit 
(deadline now passed) 
2. Compliance period Developing countries given ten years (to 2004), developed 
countries six 
3. Aggregate Measure of 
Support 
Least developed countries not required to submit these 
(largely irrelevant, since these countries have few relevant 
programmes) 
Also, all countries exempted for commodity by commodity 
support that falls below a specified portion of crop’s marketed 
value 
4. Food security issues Commodity stockpiling allowed for all countries if they 
correspond to predetermined targets & are related solely to 
food security 
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Government food purchases allowed if at market prices 
Sales can be below market prices to rural and urban poor 
Food aid allowed by direct provision, subject to clear criteria 
based on nutrition 
5. Direct payments to rural 
households 
Allowed if not linked to type of commodity or level of 
production 
Natural disaster relief allowed 
Payments under environmental programmes allowed 
Regional assistance programmes allowed 
6. The ‘ Negative Effects’ 
Decision 
[not made concrete] 
Agreement to establish mechanisms to ensure that AonA 
rules do not adversely affect LtDCs and food-deficit countries 
with regard to food security, by  
1) reviewing the adequacy of food aid; 
2) ensure that foodstuffs provided to these countries 
increasingly on a concessionary basis; and 
3) consider requests for technical & financial assistance to 
these countries to foster agricultural growth. 




2.  Structural Adjustment Programmes 
 
 Strictly speaking, the IMF lends for stabilisation, and the World Bank for 
structural adjustment.  The formal difference between the two is that the former is said 
to address short-run demand side problems, and the latter medium and long term 
structural supply problems.  This distinction is frequently encapsulated by saying that 
stabilisation involves aggregate demand management and structural adjustment 
aggregate supply enhancement.  In practice, the two tend to go together, and the 
distinction is frequently blurred.  No strict distinction is possible in practice, because 
many policies affect both aggregate demand and aggregate supply (e.g., taxation).  
This discussion will treat structural policies as specified by the international financial 
agencies, be they in programmes of the IMF, World Bank, or other multi- and bilateral 
agencies. 
 
 Table 7 provides a summary of the major policy areas addressed by structural 
adjustment conditionality.  The overall thrust of conditionality is reducing the role of 
the state in the economy.  Policy conditionality for the agricultural sector is very much 
in this spirit.  It reflects the conviction that agricultural markets perform efficiently 
relatively to government interventions, and is based upon a Pareto Optimality 
definition of efficiency.  Particularly in Africa, adjustment programmes have resulted 
in dramatic changes in agricultural policy, as Table 8 shows. 
 
 While, obviously, the designers of these programmes consider that their effect 
is to enhance growth prospects in general, and to favour the agricultural sector, they 
have come under considerable criticism.  Particularly controversial is the frequent 
assertion that the policies would tend to favour the poor (see Demery & Squire 1996, 
1997;  and a critique in Weeks 1997).  In a study for the FAO, Boussard concludes, 
 
Another characteristic of [structural adjustment programmes] is that they are 
painful…[I]n the short term, changing the rules of the economic game makes 
the risk of economic agents revise their expectations and strategies, thus 
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introducing the risk of error and failure.  Apart from expressing scepticism 
about their final success…this is probably the most serious objection that can 
be made about structural policies. 
 … 
There are other causes for concern…[I]nspite of their long-term beneficial 
effects, structural policies may at least temporarily impose severe losses to 
certain people.  Such a possibility must be taken seriously, especially if these 
people are the poorest.  In this case, it would probably be necessary to provide 
some form of compensation…Together with the poor and the landless rural 
workers, smallholders may be permanent or temporary losers in the structural 
policy game. (Boussard 1992, p. 2) 
 
 Elsewhere in this report the major policy areas of structural adjustment are 
treated in detail, thus need not be repeated here.  What is relevant in this section is to 
note that even should a government accept the full range of deregulation 
conditionalities, there remain major areas of policy intervention to foster agriculture.   
First, governments will continue to provide non-marketable facilities such as roads, 
extension services and police to enhance productivity.  However, budgetary 
conditionalities of adjustment programmes can restrict the scope for such activities.  
Second, there are a range of institutional changes that are typically absent from 
adjustment programmes, but not precluded by them:  land tenure reform and 
modernisation, fostering co-operatives for marketing of outputs and inputs, and 
comity credit organisations.  Third, the provision of social services can service as 
important vehicle for reducing inequality and raising productivity of poor farm 
households. 
 
 While adjustment programmes require a contraction of the state in some areas, 
there is scope for expansion in others.  This said, constructing a purposeful policy for 
agricultural growth is a challenge in the context of adjustment programmes.  This is 
particularly the case if a government judges that market forces, even supported by 




Table 7:  Aspects of Structural Adjustment Programmes 
Policy area Policy goal Instrument or mechanism 
1.Exchange rate Correct imbalance in external account, 
generate more efficient allocation of 
resources through comparative 
advantage 
Until recently, a free-floating exchange 
rate preferred;  mixed outcomes from 
this policy leave ‘best practice’ in flux 
2. Trade policies Same as above Tariffication, drastic reduction in 
variation across tariff lines, tariff 
reduction, elimination of export 
subsidies, reduction in export taxes 
(similar to WTO requirements, but 
usually more stringent) 
3. Fiscal policy Deficit reduction to reduce inflation or 
‘crowding out’ 
In practice, expenditure reduction tends 
to be preferred to tax increases, strong 




Expenditure reallocation in favour of 
social sectors and facilitating expansion 
of tradable commodities 
Frequently there is conditionality for 
privatising public services 
5. Public 
enterprises 
Increase efficiency through 
commercialisation 
Privatisation, independence from 
political influence, or closure 
6. Financial  
sector 
Development of financial sector, 
increased allocative efficiency 
Elimination of interest rate subsidies, 
independent central bank, privatisation 
or closure of development banks 
7. Industrial 
policy 
Increase allocative efficiency Elimination of trade protection, 
subsidies, directed credit, privatisation 
8. Energy  
policy 
Foster efficiency energy use Reform pricing to cover full costs, 
9. Agricultural 
policy 
Increase allocative efficiency Abolish any marketing boards, 
eliminate input subsidies, eliminate 
credit subsidies, abolish any price 
controls, privatise agricultural services 
(marketing, transport, etc.) 
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Table 8:  Changes in Agricultural Policies in Africa in the 1980s 
Country Summary of reforms 
Central African 
Republic 
Liberalised marketing of domestic food crops, simplified licensing 
procedures for traders, abolished support prices, repealed statutes licensing 
merchants, reduced role of price stabilisation board to quality control & 
enforcing compliance with Int’l Coffee Agreement, guaranteed marketing 
margins for coffee eliminated 
Côte d’Ivoire Ended subsidised sales of cotton to domestic mills, phased out fertiliser 
subsidies, liberalised fertiliser imports, agric public enterprises granted 
autonomy 
Egypt Deregulated all food & export crop marketing (except cotton, rice & sugar) 
The Gambia Removed restrictions on internal trade in rice, removed subsidies on 
imported rice 
Ghana Privatised functions of parastalals 
Guinea Decontrolled internal prices (except rice and petroleum), closed or 
privatised most large commercial public enterprises 
Kenya Deregulated meat & dairy sector, divested parastatal enterprises in these 
sectors, Cereals & Produce Board changed to be buyer of last resort (rather 
than monopoly purchaser), grower co-operatives proposed to market maize 
& wheat 
Madagascar Reduced or eliminated a range of consumer subsidies, reduced marketing & 
price controls, abolished or restructured state enterprises, private sector 
food marketing legalised, state intervention in food marketing reduced to 
setting ceiling & floor prices 
Malawi Liberalised agric trading (except cotton & tobacco), partial elimination of 
fertilisers 
Mali Official prices changed to floor & ceiling prices, private sector allowed to 
trade in coarse grains & imported rice, domestic paddy market liberalised 
& public sector intervention in urban rice markets ended, official prices for 
coarse grains ended, grain stocks used only for food security [rice imports 
banned in 1987] 
Morocco Privatisation of most parastatals 
Mozambique Liberalised fruit, vegetable & small livestock markets, private agents 
allowed to trade in food crops 
Niger Number of products governed by official prices reduced, subsidies on agric 
implements abolished & reduced on inputs, public role in cereal marketing 
reduced to strategic stock holding, privatisation of parastatals 
Nigeria Abolished marketing boards (cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, palm oil, rubber, 
grain, roots & tubers) 
Senegal Liquidated parastatal for groundnuts and cereals, maize, sorghum & millet 
marketing liberalised, reduced subsidies to Regional Development 
Authorities, fertiliser trade liberalised & subsidies reduced, seed input 
supply liberalised, imported inputs liberalised 
Somalia Abolished parastatals on maize, sorghum, imported foods, agric prices 
liberalised, input subsidies ended, autonomy to parastatals, food aid sold at 
public auction to private traders 
Tanzania Removed maize meal & agric input subsidies, raised official producer 
prices (became floor prices), decontrolled prices on all products but 12 
essential commodities, liberalised domestic transport charges 
Togo Privatisation of some parastatals 
Uganda Liberalised cotton marketing, free movement of foodstuffs, liberalised tea 
& sugar marketing, liberalised export of food crops 
Zaire Eliminated ceilings on producer prices, farmgate prices decontrolled, taxes 
on interregional trade eliminated, abolished parastatal trading in cotton, 
maize, sugar, livestock, edible oils, coffee, cocoa, rubber 
Zambia Increased official producer prices, wheat prices deregulated,  maize trade 
liberalised 
Source: Thompson 1991, pp. 22-26;  Smith & Thomson 1991, pp. 87-108
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3.  Agricultural Policy & Food Security in light of the WTO  And Structural 
Adjustment 
 
 There are several policy areas relevant to agriculture which are covered by 
both the UR and structural adjustment programmes.  In almost all cases, structural 
adjustment conditionalities are stricter than UR rules.  This results because the latter 
have the more limited goal of fostering trade, while the former seek to establish a 
consistent, deregulated policy framework across all sectors and aspects of an 
economy.  As explained earlier in this guide, the criteria for UR rules is trade itself, 
while structural adjustment programmes are based analytically on the theoretically 
problematical Pareto framework. 
 
 Let us assume that a government of a developing country wishes to foster food 
security, and is not confident that market forces would realise this outcome (see 
Mosley 1994).  Were the government to enter the WTO, it would find that it was 
permitted a range of policy interventions.  The most important limitation would be 
that it would have to convert quotas to tariffs, and could not set these tariffs above 
proving levels.  This commitment would still leave considerable scope for protecting 
domestic producers of basic foodstuffs.  The limitations on support to producers 
would be, for most developing countries, and virtually all low-income countries, not-
binding on policy.  Few of these countries have applied support measures to any 
degree.  The government might foster innovation by smallholders though the supply 
of inputs at below world market prices.  This would not conflict with UR rules if 
implemented as a poverty strategy, or as part of an environmental programme.  
Infrastructure provision, extension services, and even marketing subsidies could be 
implemented without conflicting with WTO rules.  In summary, while a government 
takes on a long-run obligation to liberalise trade when it joins the WTO, this 
obligation leaves scope for considerable policy options in agriculture.  Further, if the 
Negative Effects Decision is operationalised, both food aid and technical assistance 
might increase to low-income and food-deficit countries. 
 
 Adjustment programmes are much more restrictive.  The World Development 
Report of 1998 placed a new (for the World Bank) emphasis on the positive role of 
the public sector.  However, this new emphasis does not seem to have had a strong 
influence on the design of subsequent adjustment programmes.  Adjustment 
programmes do allow for targeting of the poor.  In principle this could be used to 
stimulate the smallholder sector through a variety of programmes that deliver credit 
and inputs.  In practice, distinguishing poor rural families from non-poor rural 
families, the necessary condition for targeting, is extremely difficult in a low-income 
country (see Annex 1, targeting). 
 
Table 9: 
Policy Options under the UR (Agreement on Agriculture) 
And Structural Adjustment Programmes 





Limited by AMS 
commitments; though 
Exempt if less than 10% of 
value of production 
No 
Viewed as fostering 
allocative inefficiency & 
implying high budget cost 
Policy should distinguish 
between support and 
stabilisation (the latter may 
be acceptable) 




Exempt under certain 
conditions;  otherwise part 
of AMS& limited; 
 
Input subsidies to poor 
farmers are exempt 
Viewed as fostering 
allocative inefficiency & 
implying high budget cost; 
might accept if targeted on 
poverty criteria 








As above,  
Input subsidies to poor 
farmers are exempt 
Unclear 
Might accept if poverty 
targeted 






However, export taxes not 
contrary to UR, and 
Transport & marketing 
subsidies on exports 
exempt 
No 
Only limited use of tariffs 
is acceptable; opposed to 
export taxes 
UR allows considerable 
scope for active 






No restriction if not linked 
to production levels or 
crops 
Mixed 
Not opposed in principle, 
but like to object to budget 
cost 
May not be feasible in 




Consumer subsidies do not 
affect compliance; 
Stockholding not contrary 
to compliance 
No 
Opposed to consumer 
subsidies in principle 
(distortionary) and in 
practice (budget cost) 
UR allows considerable 






Marketing subsidies which 
affect all commodities are 
excluded; 
No 
SAPs negative on all 
subsidies 
Export promotion can be 
pursued through 







However, might be 
affected by deficit 
reduction 
Could be key element in 
agricultural development 
policy 
Source:  Adapted from FAO, 1998a, pp. 94-104 
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Annex 1:  Summary of Agriculture-specific Policies 
 
The following list includes the most widely used national commodity 
intervention measures relevant to price policy in developing market economies 
(reproduced from FAO 1987, pp. 38-43). 
 
1. Guaranteed floor price, government procurement and distribution, no monopoly.  
This widely used system enables government to exercise a broad influence over price 
structure.  Its success depends on good judgement of the level of price support, 
adequate funds for purchase, storage capacity and effective management.  It is not 
generally suitable for perishables.  The policy is usually backed by some regulation of 
imports or exports of the commodity and of substitutes. 
2.  Fixed price, government procurement and sales, monopoly.  Fairly widely used, 
this method implies no role for private marketing channels unless as agents for the 
parastatal.  It is usually backed by some regulation of exports and imports of the 
commodity and of substitutes.  As this policy demands a high level of administrative 
capacity for effective operation and is often inflexible and costly, experience with it in 
developing countries is adverse, on balance. 
3.  Official mandatory producer prices, without back-up arrangements other than 
price checks.  This is a generally weak policy instrument, but may be temporarily 
effective if well monitored. 
4.  Deficiency payments.  A 'transparent' form of meeting any shortfall of market 
prices or returns from a guaranteed target, this approach does not interfere with the 
functioning of market prices.  Budgetary cost is an open-ended commitment.  It can 
be administratively demanding, and has been used more in developed than in 
developing countries. 
5.  Supply management.  More developed countries use this method to limit 
production by controlling land inputs.  Its effectiveness in practice is usually only 
over short- to medium-term.  It may have limited application in large developing 
countries for controlling grain movements between surplus and deficit regions and for 
helping to implement quota restrictions under international commodity agreements. 
6.  Buffer stocks.  Under international or unilateral producer ownership, this scheme is 
fairly popular to reduce price variation by inverse linking of stocks with market price 
changes.  Though intuitively appealing, the system has many disadvantages and 
operational problems, especially because of mistaken market export forecasts.  Recent 
research emphasises the possibility that total explicit and implicit costs may outweigh 
benefits, both overall and to producers, but unambiguous national buffer stocks are a 
necessary component of government-backed guaranteed minimum price schemes. 
7.  Buffer funds.  An inter-temporal shifting of part of market proceeds from 
favourable to depressed periods has been fairly widely used for stabilisation purposes 
for export products.  Sometimes income accumulated in buoyant price periods gets 
diverted to other uses (e.g. general government revenue, development expenditures or 
for cross-stabilisation of consumer food prices), thus undermining the capacity of the 
buffer fund to support prices in a market downturn.  Individual producer participation 
is technically possible but administratively demanding. 
8.  Export duties, taxes and commodity levies.  These instruments are widely used in 
developing countries.  They lower domestic prices, and will benefit a country if it is a 
large exporter with influence over market price.  Variable taxes and levies can 
improve domestic price stability.  Agriculture is usually adversely affected because 
resources move out of the sector and price incentives to producers are lessened. 
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9.  Export subsidies.  This regrettable trading practice is prevalent in policies of some 
developed rather than developing countries.  The subsidies may help to establish new 
external markets or to defend or widen existing ones.  Apart from their legitimate use 
as temporary payments in stabilisation schemes, export subsidies destroy the 
comparative advantage basis of international trade and so impose global costs. 
10.  Parastatal export monopoly with administered producer prices.  This is the most 
common mechanism for agricultural exporting in developing countries.  It is 
operationally useful and can improve producer price stability.  Experience indicates 
the danger of administered prices diverging too much from those implied by 
supply/demand, or from world price trends, if there is no automatic link.  There may 
be adverse effects on agriculture as noted for export taxes and commodity levies, 
11.  Quantitative export restrictions.  Main use in developing countries as a quick-
acting measure to ensure adequacy of supplies for domestic market.  Economic results 
similar to export tax.  Useful as emergency measure but otherwise carries danger of 
encouraging foreign importers to seek alternative source of supply. 
12.  Automatic stabilising link of domestic to export prices.  A seemingly effective 
“moving average" linking of domestic producer prices with international price trends 
but as far as is known not yet employed in developing countries.  Transparency of 
results may not always be politically appealing. 
13.  Import duties, taxes or variable levies.  Duties are a traditional, widely used and 
effective way of raising domestic prices of imports without blocking international 
price influences.  Variable levies give whatever degree of protection is desired by 
insulating domestic prices from world fluctuations.  They therefore exacerbate 
international price instability.  Developing countries may use them to insulate 
domestic prices from the effects of imports subsidised at their source, but such a use 
carries the danger of introducing long-term price distortions. 
14.  Import subsidies. (See also consumer subsidies and food aid.) Subsidies are 
usually employed in conjunction with direct imports by government which are sold 
below cost.  By adding to domestic supplies, subsidised imports can lower or stabilise 
domestic prices.  They are most useful as a temporary measure in the face of a severe 
rise in international price.  Otherwise. they constitute a production disincentive to the 
agricultural sector. 
15.  Parastatal import monopoly with administered domestic sales prices.  This 
mechanism, widely used in developing countries, is usually operated in conjunction 
with domestic schemes to implement commodity price targets by restricting or 
programming competing imports.  It is effective, although experience indicates a 
danger of introducing substantial price distortions in either direction. 
16.  Quantitative import restrictions and quotas.  This quick-acting and powerful 
mechanism is widely used in developing countries to ensure that domestic price 
targets or guaranteed levels are not reduced by competition from cheaper import 
supplies.  As the rate of protection varies inversely with the level of world prices, 
there is the danger of encouraging misallocation of production resources.  Windfall 
gains are likely for those with rights to quota imports. 
17.  Direct food aid from abroad.  This form of resource transfer is widely received 
by developing countries.  If its distribution creates additional demand, or if the 
supplies are used to counter emergencies, the results are wholly beneficial.  It can 
otherwise moderate or prevent food price increases and hence act as a production 
disincentive.  It saves foreign exchange.  It may also encourage dependence on foods 
not produced domestically.  The use of food aid to strengthen national price policy is 
now being investigated. 
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18.  Administered exchange rates.  This is an element of price policy in virtually all 
developing countries, and likely to be of dominating importance where agricultural 
trade is large relative to production.  It can have a beneficial, stabilising influence on 
domestic prices, but carries the serious danger of overvaluation, with the consequent 
artificial lowering of domestic prices for agricultural imports and exports.  Such 
prices can lead to profound and adverse structural implications for the agricultural 
sector. 
19.  Fixed or controlled consumer prices and price ceilings.  Consumer prices set by 
official decree are fairly common in developing countries, chiefly for staples such as 
rice, wheat flour or bread, sugar and milk.  Policy is generally intended to check price 
rises; the prices are therefore ceiling prices.  A subsidy is frequently involved, 
carrying the danger of excessive fiscal burdens.  Enforcement tends to be difficult, 
and if successful it may represent a producer price disincentive.  Ceilings may 
discourage seasonal stockholding and so worsen shortages of supplies in the pre-
harvest period.   
20.  Consumer food subsidies. Consumer subsidies are widely used in developing 
countries, generally to provide cheaper urban food.  Budgetary costs can easily 
become excessive, while the subsidies are difficult to withdraw or to reduce 
substantially.  Targeted subsidies ensure that benefits go to the designated groups for 
whom lower-priced food is essential, while containing fiscal costs.  
21.  Rationing.  Widely used mechanism at times of shortage, rationing can also 
prevent or moderate price rises and ensure more equitable access to limited supplies.   
22.  Input price measures.  Many Governments intervene not only in commodity 
pricing but also in the pricing of production inputs.  They may subsidise or directly 
control prices of farm inputs, such as fertiliser, or provide credit to finance the 
purchase of such inputs.  Other interventions include reduced duties or the application 
of a favourable exchange rate on imported inputs or their components, transport 
subsidies and crop insurance at less than full actuarial cost.  Such input subsidies are 
an integral part of agricultural price policy in many countries.   
23. Land access policies.  See sub-section on land tenure and rights of access (III.5). 
24. Credit policy.   
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Annex 2:  The Least Developed Countries 
 
 As described in the text, the Least Developed Countries are given dispensation 
from virtually all the requirements of AonA.  The dispensation is based on the 
judgement that this group of countries lacks some or all of the prerequisites to take 
advantage of the trade-expanding measures fostered by the Uruguay Round.  These 
include: 
1.  on a bureaucratic level, the governments may lack the expertise to have 
delivered the Country Schedules required of other UR participants; 
2.  the economies of the LtDCs, because of their extreme underdevelopment, 
lack the flexibility to take advantage of, or minimise the cost of, changes in 
world economic conditions;  and 
3.  the economic performance of the LtDCs has been poor compared to other 
developing countries. 
 In its 1993-1994 report on the LtDC, UNCTAD highlighted the last point:   
…[F]or the [Least Developed Countries] as a whole per capita income has 
declined each year since the adoption [by the UN General Assembly] of the 
Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the 1990s.  This 
decline increasingly translates into poorer caloric intakes, increased mortality 
and morbidity, lower school enrolment, deeper immiserization of the weakest 
member of societies, and other signs of acute social distress.51 (UNCTAD 
1994), p. I) 
 These countries are of special importance to the FAO, for several reasons.  
First, these countries, more than any other group, lack the trained people to provide 
technical support to agriculture.  Therefore, these countries would or should tend to be 
the most intensely served by FAO technical assistance.  Second, because of their 
dispensation from most WTO rules, the governments of these countries face a wide 
range of policy options.  As with technical expertise, the governments may lack the 
economic expertise to evaluate, formulate, and implement policies effectively.  Third, 
the agricultural performance of the LtDCs has been significantly worse than for other 
groups of developing countries.  For these reasons, their agricultural performance and 
policy options are treated in this annex. 
 
 Table 2.2 gives the annual per capita food production for each LtDC over 
twenty-seven years, 1970-1996.  The numbers present a quite dismal, if not shocking, 
picture.  During the 1970s, of the forty-one countries for which there are data, per 
capita production was lower at the end of the decade in twenty-six case (sixty-three 
percent).  In the 1980s, the percentage of countries with declining food output per 
head fell slightly, to sixty percent, then rose in the 1990s to seventy-nine percent 
(twenty-nine out of forty-one).  As disappointing as these numbers are, the conclusion 
is more negative still when one takes the twenty-seven years as a whole.  Over this 
period, almost three decades, only eight countries showed significantly positive trends 
in food output per head (nineteen percent of the countries with data), and twenty-eight 
had significant negative trends (two-thirds).  In other words, slightly more than eighty 
percent of the LtDCs have suffered from either declining or stagnant food production 
for a generation.  Thus, reviving the growth of food production in the LtDCs is an 
urgent priority. 
                                                          
51 One indicator of ‘social distress’ is that at least fifteen of the forty-seven countries suffered from 
internal wars or severe civil unrest in the 1990s. 
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 For these countries, reviving growth will involve considerably more than 
establishing a benign policy framework.  More than other countries, the LtDCs tend to 
suffer from inadequate transport networks and marketing systems (ODI 1995, p. 4).  
Particularly important for the FAO, the agricultural techniques in these countries 
require technical improvement.  Many of the countries are passing through a phase in 
which land-extensive cultivation is under strain from population growth.  As a result, 
‘traditional’ techniques, which may have been appropriate in the past, can no longer 
be sustained. 
 
Table 2.1:  A List of Least Developed Countries (47) 
Afghanistan Guinea Niger 
Bangladesh Guinea-Bissau Rwanda 
Benin  Haiti Samoa 
Bhutan  Kiribati Sao Tome & Principe 
Botswana Laos Sierra Leone 
Burkina Faso Lesotho Solomon Islands 
Burundi Liberia Somalia 
Cambodia Madagascar Sudan 
Cape Verde Malawi Togo 
Central African Republic Maldives Tuvalu 
Chad  Mali Uganda 
Comoros Mauritania Tanzania 
Djibouti Mozambique Vanuatu 
Equatorial Guinea Myanmar Yemen 




Table 2.2:  Per Capita Food Production in Least Developed countries, 1970-1996 
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1979 
1970 
Afghanistan na na na na na na na na na na na 
Bangladesh 113 103 98 105 99 107 101 105 106 103 91 
Benin 90 87 86 89 81 77 88 85 93 93 104 
Bhutan 95 96 97 97 98 99 99 99 100 100 106 
Botswana 172 182 173 158 156 147 159 146 113 141 82 
Burkina Faso 93 88 81 72 79 87 77 76 82 84 90 
Burundi 117 119 108 121 109 120 121 121 111 108 93 
Cambodia 156 123 97 71 58 68 64 62 59 47 30 
Cape Verde 61 53 52 50 48 49 55 53 59 61 100 
Cen Af Rp 91 92 93 95 102 104 100 101 96 100 110 
Chad 133 128 119 108 108 112 113 113 117 117 87 
Comoros na na na na na na na na na na na 
Djibouti 79 77 76 71 72 68 71 65 64 81 103 
Eq Guinea 260 197 132 151 162 148 127 132 134 132 51 
Ethiopia 144 134 132 130 121 122 118 114 120 128 89 
Gambia, The 229 238 204 234 212 199 191 141 176 105 46 
Guinea 128 131 125 127 126 126 128 127 122 122 95 
Guinea-Bissau 105 92 98 94 91 98 105 84 83 83 80 
Haiti 126 128 129 129 130 130 132 126 131 131 104 
Kiribati 133 150 112 144 172 103 133 132 150 135 101 
Lao PDR 90 82 79 80 80 76 63 65 70 80 89 
Lesotho 132 132 111 126 151 124 102 129 123 117 88 
Liberia na na na na na na na na na na na 
Madagascar 125 119 120 117 127 120 121 108 118 109 87 
Malawi 118 138 139 140 136 126 131 137 135 129 109 
Maldives 115 116 108 110 109 120 111 116 108 102 89 
Mali 107 102 87 78 87 98 99 98 100 98 92 
Mauritania 134 128 119 101 95 95 102 107 110 109 81 
Mozambique 155 160 161 166 158 142 132 126 119 117 76 
Myanmar 92 92 85 89 88 91 90 91 98 97 105 
Nepal 91 89 84 90 90 91 88 85 85 80 89 
Niger 152 153 150 97 114 102 122 138 142 143 94 
Rwanda 117 116 110 110 104 115 118 119 116 121 103 
Samoa 87 103 97 93 99 95 93 99 91 106 122 
Sao Tome&Pr 231 242 228 233 215 174 166 167 166 182 79 
Sierra Leone 115 113 112 110 112 116 115 115 117 104 91 
Solomon Is 136 135 127 126 124 124 124 123 124 136 100 
Somalia na na na na na na na na na na na 
Sudan 122 122 123 121 132 134 126 135 132 127 104 
Tanzania 101 99 96 97 94 104 106 110 109 112 110 
Togo 125 127 116 115 110 111 104 98 103 108 86 
Uganda 135 130 129 122 128 136 128 122 123 91 68 
Yemen, Rep. 88 106 99 105 104 121 112 111 105 109 124 
Zambia 106 115 132 114 117 136 152 138 122 100 95 
Zimbabwe 114 144 161 125 146 131 142 139 134 108 95 
   Increase: 15 
   Decrease: 26 
   No data: 4 
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Table 2.2: Per Capita Food Production in LtDC, 1970-1996 (continued) 
  1989 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1980 
Afghanistan na na na na na na na na na na na 
Bangladesh 101 98 100 99 97 99 97 94 94 100 97 
Benin 85 81 79 77 95 94 96 83 97 98 105 
Bhutan 103 108 107 107 114 108 108 116 100 100 100 
Botswana 103 128 129 114 123 115 108 93 97 96 68 
Burkina Faso 76 83 81 81 80 98 107 97 108 101 120 
Burundi 105 107 103 99 94 104 107 106 106 95 88 
Cambodia 81 77 92 95 72 89 95 86 105 106 226 
Cape Verde 73 50 70 39 58 65 75 118 126 109 180 
Cen Af Rp 102 102 103 102 93 92 102 100 103 103 103 
Chad 119 110 109 109 87 104 95 93 102 99 85 
Comoros 110 96 99 102 96 97 100 102 102 101 92 
Djibouti 98 90 85 93 96 106 108 105 104 120 147 
Eq Guinea 143 150 123 115 114 105 103 111 109 101 76 
Ethiopia 122 117 124 114 100 100 114 100 100 100 78 
Gambia, The 103 147 179 136 131 109 127 128 111 126 120 
Guinea 127 125 123 115 117 109 102 98 90 95 78 
Guinea-Bissau 80 86 93 84 96 95 98 98 94 100 121 
Haiti 127 125 123 125 124 123 119 115 109 106 81 
Kiribati 121 148 135 109 155 117 96 96 145 112 83 
Lao PDR 91 97 94 94 104 105 106 95 84 103 128 
Lesotho 115 118 115 109 110 103 98 100 112 109 93 
Liberia na na na na na na na na na na na 
Madagascar 112 108 106 110 110 108 107 103 101 101 93 
Malawi 123 127 129 116 116 111 113 109 109 101 78 
Maldives 110 108 109 113 113 111 109 103 101 96 94 
Mali 99 109 111 106 94 87 98 92 99 103 104 
Mauritania 112 113 107 99 93 98 96 96 97 100 92 
Mozambique 117 115 108 101 98 97 99 97 97 99 85 
Myanmar 109 116 121 120 122 123 121 115 110 101 104 
Nepal 85 87 79 94 92 90 85 93 98 101 125 
Niger 143 134 128 121 85 91 99 85 112 99 69 
Rwanda 118 124 127 123 109 126 111 108 99 105 87 
Samoa 109 104 121 111 107 116 119 114 112 115 108 
Sao Tome&Pr 146 150 145 142 122 125 127 120 122 108 59 
Sierra Leone 105 104 109 101 104 98 107 102 102 103 98 
Solomon Is 132 139 132 128 144 145 137 104 104 103 75 
Somalia na na na na na na na na na na na 
Sudan 132 142 121 117 103 120 116 104 119 98 77 
Tanzania 102 103 104 106 105 107 106 102 99 104 93 
Togo 103 101 96 89 97 98 98 95 98 102 94 
Uganda 85 93 96 102 94 94 90 91 94 100 109 
Yemen, Rep. 109 105 102 90 94 95 107 102 115 116 107 
Zambia 102 100 92 93 88 97 98 95 116 113 112 
Zimbabwe 106 127 112 86 91 122 113 91 116 104 96 
   Increase: 17 
   Decrease: 25 
   No data: 3 
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Afghanistan na na na na na na na na na na 
Bangladesh 100 100 100 98 93 96 96 96 -0.4 .01 
Benin 99 103 102 102 103 113 111 112 1.0 .01 
Bhutan 102 99 96 94 95 93 90 89 0.0 nsgn 
Botswana 100 104 97 94 78 91 98 98 -2.7 .01 
Burkina Faso 92 107 109 111 107 104 105 114 1.3 .01 
Burundi 103 102 102 98 80 85 83 81 -1.2 .01 
Cambodia 99 95 93 94 88 107 106 107 0.9 nsgn 
Cape Verde 100 91 80 129 88 113 120 120 3.6 .01 
Cen Af Rp 100 98 101 101 102 98 98 99 0.2 .10 
Chad 91 110 108 91 107 106 96 106 -0.9 .01 
Comoros 99 100 96 99 97 99 96 97 -0.3 nsgn* 
Djibouti 107 75 77 68 70 70 69 64 0.5 nsgn 
Eq Guinea 101 98 95 94 85 77 84 83 -3.1 .01 
Ethiopia 102 99 99 na na na na na -1.5 .01 
Gambia, The 84 91 67 77 78 74 58 68 -4.8 .01 
Guinea 100 105 109 108 108 110 111 111 -1.0 .01 
Guinea-Bissau 103 97 100 100 103 102 96 93 0.3 .10 
Haiti 99 95 92 88 87 80 81 82 -1.8 .10 
Kiribati 85 103 107 97 96 95 97 114 -1.6 .01 
Lao PDR 106 92 104 95 108 97 96 91 1.3 .01 
Lesotho 111 80 80 90 106 84 105 94 -1.5 .01 
Liberia na na na na na na na na na na 
Madagascar 100 99 97 98 92 91 89 89 -1.2 .01 
Malawi 97 102 74 103 81 91 94 96 -1.9 .01 
Maldives 104 100 100 100 99 98 95 91 -0.6 .01 
Mali 99 99 95 98 102 100 96 97 0.2 nsgn 
Mauritania 101 99 91 85 86 87 91 91 -1.1 .01 
Mozambique 106 95 77 84 78 84 96 91 -2.7 .01 
Myanmar 101 98 106 116 119 127 136 135 1.3 .01 
Nepal 102 98 91 99 93 98 95 94 0.5 .01 
Niger 89 112 110 103 104 100 101 114 -1.4 .01 
Rwanda 101 94 88 76 74 79 79 79 -1.5 .01 
Samoa 101 85 83 90 89 89 88 87 -0.1 nsgn 
Sao Tome&Pr 97 95 113 111 105 107 104 107 -3.5 .01 
Sierra Leone 100 98 88 86 89 81 83 84 -1.2 .01 
Solomon Is 97 100 101 96 91 91 88 91 -1.5 .01 
Somalia na na na na na na na na na na 
Sudan 93 108 119 107 116 107 115 124 -0.8 .01 
Tanzania 100 97 89 88 85 86 82 82 -0.6 .01 
Togo 103 95 95 109 87 103 110 107 -0.7 .01 
Uganda 101 99 97 99 96 95 85 84 -1.5 .01 
Yemen, Rep. 104 83 93 95 92 92 87 84 -0.5 .05 
Zambia 94 94 78 107 87 76 89 95 -1.5 .01 
Zimbabwe 104 93 61 81 89 65 91 87 -2.4 .01 
[1990s]  increase:    12  Number Negative: 28 
decrease:     29  of countries Positive: 8 
no data:        4 with trends Non significant: 6 
 (1970-1996): no data: 3 
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